

O. MANNONI

Prospero and Caliban

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLONIZATION

SECOND EDITION

Translated by

PAMELA POWESLAND

With a Foreword by

PHILIP NASON



FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, *Publishers*
NEW YORK • WASHINGTON

call 'dependence'. It is these conditions, as I shall endeavour to show, which explain why the development of the inferiority complex is slowed down, and indeed stifled, in a community like that of the Malagasies. Dependence and inferiority form an alternative; the one excludes the other. Thus, over against the inferiority complex, and more or less symmetrically opposed to it, I shall set the dependence complex. And these two different psychological climates serve to characterize two different types of personality, two different mentalities, two different civilizations.

The fact that when an *adult* Malagasy is isolated in a different environment he can become susceptible to the classical type of inferiority complex proves almost beyond doubt that the germ of the complex was latent in him from childhood. If we were to proceed farther in this direction we should very probably—as, indeed, we shall see later in connexion with dreams—encounter the Freudian castration complex. All I need say at present, however, is that the germ remains inactive in normal conditions—that is, while the individual feels himself securely held by the traditional bonds of dependence. It could also be maintained, as I shall show, that there is a potential dependence complex in the 'inferior' European. It is repressed, however, and this makes it difficult for us to perceive and appreciate it in others. A European who is more or less the victim of an inferiority complex tends to *feel*—and not simply to *consider*—an objective position of dependence as a sign of inferiority. He may rebel against it or react by displaying 'symptoms'. The Malagasy, on the other hand—and in this there is reason to believe that he does not differ radically from other non-civilized peoples—feels inferior only when the bonds of dependence are in some way threatened. This difference is probably the key to the psychology of the 'backward peoples'. It explains the long stagnation of their civilizations. It accounts for their belief in magic, and elucidates what seems to us at first sight incomprehensible in their psychological reactions—that mentality which we have long considered incapable of 'assimilation' to our own. At a later stage I shall be describing the whole corpus of phenomena which are connected with psychological dependence, but I should like to make a few preliminary observations now.

It would be far from true to say that the Malagasies conform to a single type. There are many different ethnic groups among them, and although in the present state of our knowledge it is difficult to give an exact figure with any confidence, nevertheless it is possible to

distinguish about twenty different groups at varying stages of development. The most backward are 'primitive' in the very vague sense in which the word is used at the present time. Others have to a greater or less extent undergone European influence, and it is of course these who interest us most. To be precise, then, we shall be studying the dependence complex among Malagasies in course of colonization, and more particularly among the *Merina*.

However, our knowledge of individual psychology among the Malagasies will necessarily be less complete than it would be of Europeans. I have been able to obtain some descriptions of dreams, and these I have analysed. I have also given my interpretation of the sustained relations I have had with certain Malagasies. But there is no hope of obtaining psychoanalyses of typical Malagasies; there never have been any, and it is extremely doubtful if there could be any. Apart from the difficulty presented by a language which, though broadly comprehensible, is capable of formidable subtleties and equivocations, it would still be necessary for the Malagasy to grant the European a degree of confidence he would not accord even his best friend. Finally, we do not find in him that disharmony, amounting almost to conflict, between the social being and the inner personality which is so frequently met with among the civilized and offers the analyst a means of access to the psyche. The oriental 'face' is different from the Jungian *persona* in being more firmly welded to the whole being.

All this would seem to suggest that the ego is wanting in strength, and that is borne out by the fact that hallucinatory disturbances and panic appear the moment the feeling of security is threatened. The individual is held together by his collective shell, his social mask, much more than by his 'moral skeleton'. And this, with but slight modifications, must be true of many other 'primitive' societies. It can be proved from the way these societies treat the sick, the possessed, the bewitched—all those who in Europe would be classified as neurotics. They are usually dealt with by means of initiation dances, ceremonies, or sacrifices, all of which are intended in one way or another to bring the sufferer back into the fold, with or without his evil spirit. Curative ceremonies of this kind have been known to exist in Madagascar, although to-day there are only distorted and barely recognizable traces of them left. (See for instance what the Reverend Father Cotte has to say about them in his *Re-gardons Vivre une Tribu Malgache*, Paris, 1947, pp. 225-32.)

Dependent behaviour

The 'dependent' behaviour of the Malagasies—and also, as we shall see, of other 'primitive' peoples—has almost always been misunderstood, but Europeans have never failed to notice it and to be astonished by it. Usually they first encounter it on the occasion of an exchange of services, and the sequence of events is generally something like this. A Malagasy receives from a European some favour which he badly needs, but would never have dreamed of asking for. Afterwards he comes of his own accord and asks for favours he could very well do without; he appears to feel he has some sort of claim upon the European who did him a kindness. Furthermore, he shows no gratitude—in our sense of the word—for the favours he has received. It is absolutely essential to interpret this behaviour correctly if we are to comprehend a type of mentality so different from our own.

Here, by way of illustration, is an example of this type of behaviour.

The young Merina who acted as my tennis coach went down with fever. I visited him and as he obviously had malaria I ordered a small supply of quinine to be sent to him. He would never himself have asked me for the medicine, even though he was in great need of it, and he had not been in the habit of seeking favours from me. I used to pay him after every lesson, so that we were quite square each time. Off the courts he would bid me a rather shy good-day whenever we met in the street, but there our relationship ended.

After I had given him the quinine, a change came about. One day, at the end of a lesson, he shyly pointed out to me that his rubber shoes were worn out and that mine, although rather shabby for me, would suit him very well. I handed them over to him readily enough, but two or three days later he came to look for me outside my coaching time and told me, without any trace of embarrassment, that he was in need of cigarette papers. Now at the time cigarette papers could be bought only on the black market, but they were neither scarce nor very dear, and the young Merina earned enough at each lesson to buy several packets of them. There was therefore something incongruous in his request which required looking into. What exactly did it mean?

It meant this: that when I sent him the quinine, my 'debtor' did

not see the action simply as a helpful gesture which I had extended towards a sick man. He failed to appreciate its objective and impersonal nature. In fact he did not see it as it really was, but strictly subjectively; he was aware only of the relationship of dependence which was thereby set up between himself and me—not between a tennis-player and his coach, not between a healthy man and an invalid, but between our two selves. It must not be supposed that there was any question of interested motives or of a desire to create such a relationship simply in order to exploit it: his psychology was not that far developed, or degraded. On the contrary: the relationship itself was enough for him—it was itself reassuring. It was the relationship, ultimately, which took away his fever: he was cured, not so much because quinine is an excellent remedy for malaria, as because a Malagasy who has a protector he can count on need fear no danger; what means his protector may employ to safeguard him is of little interest to him.

In fact the gifts which the Malagasy first accepts, then asks for, and finally, in certain rare cases, even demands, are simply the outward and visible signs of this reassuring relationship of dependence. They are essential to what might be called the life of the relationship. Therefore, the more he values it, the more he is driven to multiplying the visible signs of it. In the case of my tennis-coach, I could not help smiling as I gave him the packet of cigarette papers he had asked for. After that smile he asked for nothing more; he was sensitive enough to a hint to give up a relationship in which I was not wholeheartedly engaged. He knew well enough that he could easily have obtained other favours from me, but that was not his main interest. For my part, I could have fostered and encouraged the relationship which a casual gesture of mine had launched. I could not, however, have broken it off later except at the risk of making him feel abandoned, perhaps betrayed, and of rousing his enmity or even hatred—at any rate some negative emotion which would have been directed either against me or against himself.

Only when it is thoroughly degraded does such a need for dependence change radically in nature and become mendicity. It may be noted that the latter is found virtually only in certain tribes, or even families: a detailed study would no doubt reveal that it originated in certain family customs. Furthermore, most Malagasy beggars invariably appeal to the same persons—the same 'patrons', one might say. In other words, the bonds of dependence are not

wholly depersonalized, even in these cases. In its uncontaminated state, however, the relationship is strictly personal. The Malagasy does not seek dependence on any conditions, at any price, on just anyone.

Lack of gratitude

As I have said, feelings of hostility, conscious or otherwise, are liable to arise when the bonds of dependence have snapped—when, that is, the Malagasy feels he has been abandoned. This fact is at the bottom of the belief widely held by Europeans in Madagascar that the Malagasies have no sense of gratitude.

This phrase, when used in the context of European psychology and morality, is wholly misleading, for by his failure to express gratitude the Malagasy proves in his way his nicety of feeling and his discernment. His reaction is archaic; among the various layers which go to make up what we consider the normal personality the feeling he experiences would be found fairly low down, for in us it is infantile, repressed. Our repression of it is perhaps the main reason why we are unable to appreciate it in him. There are other reasons, however, as we shall see.

We must also bear in mind certain moral prejudices of ours which prevent us seeing things as they really are and but for which we should realize that dependence excludes gratitude. That this is so is shown by the fact that we have to *teach* European children to be grateful, and even then there is an element of hypocrisy in it, for the child cannot really learn gratitude until he has attained a certain independence.¹

That is one of the reasons why we tend to repress as 'bad' the infantile feelings which were associated with dependence, while the Malagasy does not. There is no need, I think, for me to point out the grave and sometimes tragic misunderstandings to which this situation is liable to give rise between Europeans and colonial inhabitants.

The reader will find almost the whole gamut of these misunderstandings in the writings of travellers who have been struck by the natives' lack of gratitude, not specially in Madagascar but in all the countries which used to be called 'primitive'. Lévy-Bruhl quotes

¹ The word for 'thank you' (*mirihorae*) is spoken by the donor as well as by the recipient in Madagascar; the same is true among European children.

from them freely in Chapter XIII of his book, *Primitive Mentality*, pp. 410 f. Although there are differences which I am unable to explain for lack of the necessary personal knowledge, it is clear that the kinds of behaviour described are examples of dependent behaviour in the sense in which I have used the expression. But the authors he quotes failed, one and all, to understand the significance of the behaviour they described, and it might be worth our while to consider why. Lévy-Bruhl himself, in spite of his customary penetration, was somewhat misled by the mistakes made by the travellers, and in particular, as I shall show, he was unable to rid himself of the idea of *payment*, which falsifies the interpretation.

This chapter of *Primitive Mentality* is divided into three parts. The first part contains quotations from doctors. Bentley interprets the reactions of his Congolese patients as a demand for compensation and considers it a shocking reversal of the 'normal' situation: the patient asking for fees from his doctor! Mackenzie's interpretation is hardly better, but his description is patently more accurate than that of Bentley. The cured man says to the doctor: 'Your herbs cured me. *You are now my white man*. Please to give me a knife,' and he adds, '*I shall always come to beg of you*.' But, like Bentley, Mackenzie sees it as 'a most wonderful transposition of relationship,' and after relating a discussion in which he tried in vain to make the man see that he should be grateful, he says, 'I gave the man up as a very wonderful specimen of jumbled ideas.' Mr Williams, who worked among the Fiji Islanders, describes how a sick man who was receiving treatment asked for food: 'The reception of food he considered as giving him a claim on me for covering; and, that being secured, he deemed himself at liberty to beg anything he wanted, and abuse me if I refused his unreasonable request. Here we find resentment (i.e. abandonment) also reported. Again, an injured man was treated, but when he was refused something he had asked for he showed his sense of obligation by burning down one of the captain's drying-houses, containing fish of the value of three hundred dollars.' We may be perfectly sure that the behaviour here described, though less delicate in form, is exactly comparable with the type of behaviour I have been describing among the Malagasies.

In the second part of the chapter Lévy-Bruhl offers an explanation based on the assumption that the native does not understand the treatment given him. But the man who says, '*Your herbs cured me*,' and who goes on to say, '*You are now my white man*,' seems to have

understood it well enough. However, there is no need to embark on a discussion of this point, for in the third part of the chapter Lévy-Bruhl is compelled to admit that these 'inexplicable' reactions occur even in situations where there is no question of medical treatment at all: a white man has only to perform some service for the native to elicit this behaviour from him, even if there is nothing which he could have any difficulty in understanding. For instance, a Congolese native whose canoe had capsized asked the missionary who rescued him to 'dress' him. When he refused, the man became 'abusive' and had to be locked up in the store and fined two goats by way of a 'lesson' to make him more grateful in the future.

The explanation Lévy-Bruhl offers is that the native thinks he has a right to compensation because he has suffered some loss in the mystical sphere. The native, he believes, argues thus: 'Henceforward you (white man) are my refuge and my support, and I have the right to reckon on you to compensate me for what your intervention has cost me with the mystic powers upon whom my social group depends, and upon whom I myself have depended till now.' But how could it cost anything, mystically, to be saved from drowning? Why did not the man who said, 'Your herbs cured me,' make any reference to loss?

Psychoanalysis helps us to discover what has happened: the travellers who report these incidents project upon the native their own desire for reward, and it is this projection which prevents them understanding the psychology of dependent behaviour, and makes them see it as a reversal of the proper order of things. Lévy-Bruhl's analytical method did not reveal this projection, and he himself was misled by it. He realized well enough, however, that the native is in reality 'neither "ungrateful" nor "unreasonable", as he is bound to appear in the eyes of anyone who has cared for and saved him, and who is conscious of having rendered him signal service, often from purely disinterested and humane motives. It is to be hoped that this humanity may not confine itself to dressing his ulcers, but that it may strive towards sympathetic penetration of the obscure recesses of a consciousness which cannot express itself' (the italics are mine). But in the light of analysis we can say that if these attentions had been given with complete disinterest—that is, without any expectation, conscious or unconscious, of gratitude—the observers would have run less risk of error and they would not have hoped to find among the manifestations of dependence a consciousness of gratitude, the very

idea of which is entirely lacking, at least among typical, un-degraded cases. Furthermore, the misunderstanding is not the result of the native's inability to express himself. He expresses himself extraordinarily well when for instance he says, 'You are now my white man. I shall always come to beg of you.' In what way is this formula less clear than any of the phrases we normally use to express gratitude, acknowledgement, or thanks? Why should it be odder to ask than to promise. It is just a matter of a different attitude, an attitude which is unfamiliar to us, or rather which we have repressed in ourselves. All these phenomena, then, are to be explained by the persistence of dependence as an essential part of the native's personality, which is constructed along different lines from our own. It is this difference in structure which accounts for the absence of a sense of gratitude.

Clearly, therefore, the existence of a feeling of gratitude presupposes a loosening of the bonds of dependence. What, then, are we to conclude about the structure of our own personalities? The common idea that gratitude is primarily a matter of an exchange of services against expressions of thanks is unacceptable, for it would soon lead to a feeling that there was no indebtedness where no real gratitude was felt. True gratitude seems to be an attempt to preserve a balance between two feelings which at first sight seem contradictory: on the one hand the feeling that one is very much indebted, and on the other the feeling that one is not indebted at all. It implies a rejection of dependence and yet at the same time the preservation of an *image* of dependence based on free will. It is perhaps the prototype of the obligations assumed by the independent individual outside the framework of group behaviour.¹ That is why gratitude cannot be demanded, even though in a way it is obligatory, and why, in spite of appearances, it can exist only where persons are equal. Dependence proper, at least in the form in which it is found in Madagascar, is incompatible with equality.

Before going on to look for the cause of this 'dependence complex' I should like to make clear the meaning of the term 'infantile' which we are inclined to apply to it. There is a certain amount of justification for our using the word, because such behaviour would be infantile in us. But if we allow ourselves to think that it is also

¹ This kind of bond, independent of group tradition, plays a part in the development of the personality and of civilization. It is a break-away from traditional bonds, and prepares the way for the Christian idea of 'love thy neighbour . . .'. But first it is necessary for a God, a Jupiter, to protect the unknown guest, or for the Eternal Father to make all men brothers, before such a transition is possible.

imaginary consequence of a ('guilty') desire for independence, born of a will to power. If Kinkel had been right, the Malagasies and uncontaminated 'primitives' generally—to whom, indeed, he expressly refers¹—would still have been living in a sort of psycho-sociological paradise from which Kinkel and other Europeans would have been chased at the time of the original betrayal. In that case, in trying to deliver the Malagasy from his dependence—as we must do if he is to attain to freedom and acquire a complete personality—we should be leading him along the rocky road to inferiority. Nor should we have the excuse that it is a necessary evil, that inferiority, however uncomfortable, is the only way we know of promoting the progress of the individual, for according to Kinkel it would be an absolute and incurable evil, the only possible remedy for which would be a return to lost dependence. And that, in his view, would be a return to a sort of feudalism.² His theory no doubt applies rather less than he thinks to Europeans who have resolved their dependence complex. It does apply, however, to anyone who through an affective regression has come to regret his lost dependence, and we must find out whether it would also apply to the 'primitives'—as logically it ought—the moment we 'relieve' them of their dependence. Though it is true that dependence is a hindrance to them on the path of progress, it is at the same time a wonderful protection against a ~~troubled~~ conscience, which is the heavy price we pay for our progress.

Certainly the failure of dependence, or more probably in the case of the European its rebuff, is one of the causes of the growth or the coming to light of the inferiority complex. It may be remembered that an adult Malagasy cut off from his normal environment is liable to show signs of inferiority, which is almost irrefutable proof that the complex was already present in him in latent form, but masked by dependence. Reverting to dependence, however, is only one of the possible solutions, and is a real regression. Kinkel's preference for it

traumatic effect, not because of what it was but because of how it appeared to the child, he cannot stop there, but must go on to look for the reason *why* it so appeared.

¹ In his book, *Let's be normal*, Kinkel says, 'The lives of all of us begin in full harmony with our environment. As subjects we are at first not to be differentiated from the subjects around us. We live simply in the general subjectivity of mankind as if every human being lived as we did. The infant is, to a certain extent, in the state of primal mankind. It could only remain in this condition if such a primeval people existed. It may be said, therefore, that the behaviour of an infant is based upon an illusion. His behaviour is not actually justified by his environment. . . . The child suffers from the disparity between its own behaviour and the behaviour of the environment. The environment constrains the child's unhappiness as an unjustifiable demand or even as an egoistic claim, whereas the child feels that he has been betrayed by the adults.'

² At least according to Brachfeld in *Sentiments d'infériorité*, p. 100.

is suspect. Surely the best way of resolving the complex would be to attain a complete and independent personality—to become an apprentice to freedom. Man has invented many means of sublimation, ranging from God to mathematical truths by way of love of one's neighbour and professional and social obligations—in fact all the duties which will enable him to purify the bonds of dependence, so that he may progress towards his ultimate object, which is to attain a freedom founded neither upon dependence nor upon independence, but upon responsibilities freely assumed. A feeling of responsibility is essential to the attainment of an independent personality. If the collapse of dependence merely breaks the bonds without putting anything in their place, then clearly the man who finds himself suddenly independent in this way will no longer be able to tolerate guidance, but will yet be unable to guide himself. He will then fall prey to Pascalian despair, existentialist anguish, dereliction. The paths to freedom are more tortuous than this vertical drop into independence or Kinkel's straight path back to dependence.

We must not, however, underestimate what is of value—even if we have good reason to suspect a regression—in the course Kinkel advocates, namely, a return to a feudal world where the bonds restored between men would deliver them from themselves and from their torments. If left to themselves, the majority of Malagasies would, it is certain, spontaneously and even unthinkingly strive to recreate a feudal type of society. They would call it a republic or a democracy, but their need for dependence would drive them almost inevitably to organize a society composed of clientèles grouped about patrons in the way they like best.¹ They would lack the courage to face the terrors of a genuine liberation of the individual.

Even with the help of Europeans, the road to freedom would not be easy for them. It seems likely, at least according to Westernmann's observations, that the African negro, however dependent he may be on his group, would attain freedom more easily, for even in his dependent state he is accustomed to equality among members of the group and brotherhood among members of the tribe. The Malagasies lack this advantage, or perhaps lost it some centuries ago—those of them, at any rate, who have not remained sufficiently 'primitive' to be still organized in tribes. It would, indeed, be interesting to find out whether, paradoxically, the tribal and therefore most backward parts of the Malagasy population were not yet the

¹ See Part III, Ch. V, on the *fokon'olona*.

[76] It is worthy of note that disturbances broke out at the very time when a number of Europeanized Malagasies were returning to Madagascar. Some of them-those who had been truly assimilated-broke with their compatriots, and thereafter had no influence on them. Others, whose assimilation had been incomplete, fomented and led the revolts, for they are the people most likely to develop a real hatred of Europeans. Caliban's dictum

You taught me language; and my profit on't

Is, I know how to curse....,

Though over-simplifies the situation, is true in essence. It is not that Caliban has savage and uneducable instincts or that he is such poor so that even good seed would bring forth bad plants, as Prospero believes. The reason is given by Caliban himself:

...When thou camest first,

Thou strok'dst me, and mad'st much of me...

... and then I lov'd thee

-and then you abandoned me before I had time to become your equal.... In other words: you taught me to be dependent, and I was [77] happy; then you betrayed me and plunged me into inferiority. It is indeed in some such situation as this that we must look for the origin of the fierce hatred sometimes shown by "evolved" natives; in them the process of civilization has come to a halt and been left incomplete.

In contrast, the Malagasy whose personality has been neither repressed nor masked, who has preserved his original dependence complex in all its purity, is not generally a prey to hostility towards the European.....

necessary to the original game. The Malagasy, however, may suddenly find himself, the instant the bonds of dependence snap, on the brink of an abyss of inferiority, and in danger of falling in. In that case an earlier identification may result in distressingly negative phenomena. In other words, the Malagasy can bear not being a white man; what hurts him cruelly is to have discovered first (by identification) that he is a man and *later* that men are divided into blacks and whites. If the 'abandoned' or 'betrayed' Malagasy continues his identification he becomes clamorous; he begins to demand *equality* in a way he had never before found necessary. The equality he seeks would have been beneficial before he started asking for it, but afterwards it proves inadequate to remedy his ills—for every increase in equality makes the remaining differences seem the more intolerable, for they suddenly appear agonizingly irremovable. This is the road along which the Malagasy passes from psychological dependence to psychological inferiority.

The idea that the 'benefits' of the Malagasy can be increased by our giving him what he lacks, in the way a sum of money can be increased by the addition of other sums, is valid only if it is a matter of material objects such as food and tools. Applied to political, moral, or psychological 'advantages' it appears just a trifle silly. . . . If we try to alter only some aspects of a personality which is constructed differently from our own, we ought not to be surprised if the whole personality undergoes a change. Thus, it is just when the Malagasy is beginning to resemble us a little that he turns roughly from us. Our mistake lies in assuming that the personality as a whole can be treated in the way we treat the schoolboy's mind—as an empty vessel waiting to be filled. Those schoolmasters who thought that there was nothing in the mind which had not entered through the doors of the senses—and by that they meant that there was nothing in the memory except what had entered through the ears listening to the teacher or the eyes fastened upon the school-book—were ready to believe that there was nothing good in the personality but what had been put there deliberately, like plants in a garden, and that whatever happened to be growing there could be dug up like weeds. This schoolmaster's philosophy has ruled Europe with a rod of iron and is ultimately responsible for the present character of the European, with all its good and bad qualities. But if it is applied to personalities of a very different type, what is 'added' either remains an alien element or else in the long run brings about a modification

of the whole personality, some elements being integrated and others repressed.

Thus, an education confined to providing the colonial inhabitant with new tools could be very useful if it left the personality as a whole untouched and had no direct cultural import, but a culturally-biased education can disrupt the personality far more than one would expect, unless—and this is probably what most often happens—it is accepted simply at the level of the *persona*, as knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and a source of vanity—purely academic and bookish and not integrated into the whole being. We have yet to find an educational method which is somewhere between these two extremes. For the moment we must be content not to influence the personality or unwittingly undermine it. With all this in mind we can better understand what Christianity could have done for the peoples with dependent personalities—and what it signally failed to do.

Dependence threatened

People say that we do not realize we possess a particular organ until something goes wrong with it. Similarly it may be that the dependence relationship has only now sprung to our notice because it has already been partly undermined. The individuals who have come into contact with representatives of the other civilization—and it applies to both sides—have been more profoundly affected by the encounter than might at first be supposed.¹

To my mind there is no doubting the fact that colonization has always required the existence of the need for dependence. Not all peoples can be colonized: only those who experience this need. Neither are all peoples equally likely to become colonizers, for, as I shall show later, certain other equally definite predispositions are required for that role. There are other ways of being conquered than that of becoming a subject colony, and other forms of domination than the colonial—assimilation, association, economic exploitation; there is extermination at one end of the scale, and absorption of the victor by the vanquished at the other.

¹ It must also be remembered that the elements which come into contact with each other first are in one way or another the most 'eccentric'. They would have had less chance of meeting had they been more firmly held within their respective social structures. This fact no doubt explains the exaggerated character of the acts of dependent behaviour noted by the observers whom Lévy-Bruhl quotes and which I referred to earlier. The exaggeration seems to be due to a state of dissatisfaction which aggravates the hunger for dependence.

Wherever Europeans have founded colonies of the type we are considering, it can safely be said that their coming was unconsciously expected—even desired—by the future subject peoples. Everywhere there existed legends foretelling the arrival of strangers from the sea, bearing wondrous gifts with them.¹ From the early seventeenth century onwards any shipwrecked sailor was welcomed with open arms, and the chiefs quarrelled over possession of them. True, these Europeans were on occasions massacred. But we cannot tell to what extent they may have frightened the natives by their strange behaviour and their incomprehensible demands. Certain it is that at the start there was nothing indicative of racial hatred; whatever there was rather favoured the white man than otherwise, at least in Madagascar.

When the colonizer first appears, it is not as an enemy but as a stranger, as a guest. In Madagascar he is called *vagada*, an expression which means as nearly as possible, 'honourable stranger'.² He seizes authority only when at length through his persistent demands—the native finds him insatiable³—he has provoked part of the population to display defence reactions. It is in this sense that we can say that the colonies were conquered. But in most cases, in its ordinary meaning, it is a distortion of the facts to make them fit a preconceived pattern, for the armed forces employed would have been inadequate for the task had we not been helped by our unconscious accomplices in the souls of the natives themselves. In 1947, after fifty years of colonial rule, tribes allegedly unwelcome, armed only with pointed sticks—which the communiqués described as assegais—attacked positions defended with Lewis guns and hand-grenades. Yet at the time when Madagascar was first conquered the Malagasies had been drawn up in armed formations—and had fled at the first shots fired. It cannot have been force alone, therefore, which vanquished Madagascar; force would not have conquered and kept the island had not the Malagasy people, long before our arrival, been ready for our coming.

¹ One of many examples of these beliefs may be found in *Notes, Reconnaissance et Exploration*, Antananarivo, 1897, and vol., p. 196.

² *Vagada* has recently acquired a pejorative sense. After the revolt, the *leo* at the hotel where I used to dine in Antananarivo took to calling me *Karagaby*, which is the word used to address a Malagasy as 'sir'. Surprised by this new form of address, I looked for an explanation; it was a way of telling me that they were not confusing me with the colonialists.

³ That is the impression invariably produced on a personality psychologically dependent by a personality psychologically inferior.

Moreover, the Europeans themselves only made a show of believing in military force; they knew instinctively, and barely consciously, where their strength lay—in a certain 'weakness' of personality on the part of the Malagasies. They were not to know that their position of dominance was due to the fact that in the network of dependences they occupied roughly the same position as the dead ancestors. . . . But they were aware that the psychological situation favoured them, and knew that force alone would be powerless once that situation changed. Proof of this is the alarm and anger with which they greeted any attempt by the natives to gain emancipation. This was not the reasonable reaction of men sure of their own strength preparing to meet a danger with energetic measures. Those few Europeans who, because they were unaffected by the contagion, were able to observe the colonials' reactions dispassionately will confirm that it looked very much like panic and that there was a tendency to take violent, spectacular, rather pointless or downright harmful actions. In the following chapter the reader will find an account of the psychological causes of this attitude.

From the very beginning of the revolt, in March 1947, the Europeans in Madagascar began to behave in a paradoxical and consequently very revealing fashion. Those who were in the area of the revolt displayed great self-possession and courage, and after the initial surprise which caused some loss of life, there were virtually no more casualties. The story is told, for instance, of the colonial who held out single-handed against three hundred assailants, with only a shotgun and twenty rounds, for ten days before being rescued.

In places far from the actual disturbances, however, a mixture of fear, excitement, and anger gained possession of the Europeans. In the capital they took defensive precautions out of all proportion to the real danger, to the extent of depriving other parts of the country which were more closely threatened of the help they badly needed.¹ The emotion generated was evidently unrelated to the degree of real

¹ For instance, one of the Antananarivo hotels, two steps from police headquarters and with a self-propelled gun almost on its doorstep, obtained for its defence two machine-guns which were entrusted to the residents. (They were sorely needed on the east coast where the colonials were beleaguered.) Armed Senegalese soldiers mounted guard outside the rooms of the officers' wives. Hotel residents, armed, patrolled the town. These patrols served no purpose, for there was no sign of real danger, nor did any ever arise in the town. The danger, at that moment, was over a hundred miles away. But the significant point is that two months later, when the rebellion had spread as a result of repressive measures which roused uncertain terror everywhere, danger in fact drew near to Antananarivo. Then, the European inhabitants of the town recovered their calm completely and behaved with normal good sense. What better proof could there be of the purely emotional character—to say no more—of the earlier reactions?

The dependence relationship requires at least two members, and where a colonial situation exists, if one of them is the native or the colony, the other is likely to be the colonizer, or rather the study. The real colonizer is almost of necessity a man of strong character, a creator rather than an acceptor of relationships, at least at the outset. It is only later that he becomes a colonial. The typical colonial, on the other hand, finds the relationship ready made; he takes it up, adapts himself to it, and very often exploits it. And in any case, whether he accepts it passively or seizes upon it greedily, the relationship changes him more than he it. It is precisely this transformation which sets a stamp on him, which makes him a colonial. And it is this which we must now study if we are to find out the exact psychological nature of the relations which form between the European colonial and the dependent native-if we are to understand how and why these relations change with time and what effect they have on the two members.

The reader will see that in trying to discover how it is that a European, to all appearances indistinguishable from other Europeans, can become, sometimes in a very short space of time, a typical colonial and very different from his former self, I have reached a conclusion which is at first sight paradoxical-namely, that the personality of the colonial is made up, not of characteristics acquired during and through experience of the colonies, but of traits, very often in the nature of a complex, already in existence in a latent and repressed form in the European's psyche, traits which the colonial experience has simply brought to the surface and made manifest. Social life in Europe exerts a certain pressure on the individual, and that pressure keeps the personality in a given shape; once it is removed, however, the outlines of the personality change and swell, thus revealing the existence of internal pressures which had up to then passed unnoticed....

[105] The colonial situation is even more clearly portrayed in *The Tempest* than in *Robinson Crusoe*, which is the more remarkable in that Shakespeare certainly thought less about it than did Defoe. Shakespeare's theme is the drama of the renunciation of power and domination, which are symbolized by magic, a borrowed power which must be rendered up. Man must learn to accept himself as he is and to accept others as they are, even if they happen to be called Caliban. This is the only wise course, but the path towards wisdom is long and infinitely painful for Prospero.

There is no doubting the nature of Prospero's magical power, for at his side we find his obedient daughter-and magic is the child's image of paternal omnipotence. Whenever his absolute authority is threatened, and however slight the threat, Prospero-our aspirant to wisdom-always becomes impatient and almost neurotically touchy. The essence of the problem is revealed at the outset; Prospero Lays down his magic garment and prepares to tell Miranda the story of his life. In other words, he tries to treat Miranda as an equal; but he fails. He begins with "Obey and be attentive," and the recital is punctuated with other orders of the same kind, all

absurd and quite unwarranted; later in the play he even goes so far as to threaten Miranda with his hatred. It is the same with Ariel; Prospero has promised him his liberty, but fails to give it to him. He constantly reminds Ariel that he freed him from the knotty entrails of a cloven pine in which the terrible mother, Sycorax, had confined him. This again means that Prospero has the absolute authority of the father. Caliban is the unruly and incorrigible son who is disowned. Prospero says he was 'got by the devil himself'. At the same time he is the useful slave who [106] is ruthlessly exploited. But Caliban, does not complain of being exploited; he complains rather of being betrayed, in Künkel's sense of the word: he says, explicitly,

...When thou camest first,
Thou strok'dst me, and mad'st much of me; wouldst give me
Water with berries in't; and teach me how
To name the bigger light, and how the less,
That burn by day and night: and then I lov'd thee,

but now

...you sty me
In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me
The rest o' the island.

Caliban has fallen prey to the resentment which succeeds the break-down of dependence. Prospero seeks to justify himself: did Caliban not attempt to violate the honour of his child? After such an offence, what hope is there? There is no logic in this argument. Prospero could have removed Caliban to a safe distance or he could have continued to civilize and correct him. But the argument: you tried to violate Miranda, *therefore* you shall chop wood, belongs to a non-rational mode of thinking. In spite of the various forms this attitude may take (it includes, for instance, working for the father-in-law, a common practice in patriarchal communities), it is primarily a justification of hatred on grounds of sexual guilt, and it is at the root of colonial racialism.

I was given a clue to the explanation of this racialism while questioning a European colonial, who expressed the belief that the black race had become inferior to the white through excessive masturbation! The man himself was troubled by parental prohibitions in this respect. The 'inferior being' always serves as scapegoat; our own evil intentions can be projected on to him. This applies especially to incestuous intentions; Miranda is the only woman on the island, and Prospero and Caliban the only men. It is easy to see why it is always his daughter or his sister or his neighbour's wife (never his own) whom a man imagines to have been violated by a negro; he wants to rid himself of guilt by putting the blame for his bad thoughts on someone else. Caliban, in this hopeless situation, begins plotting against Prospero not to win his freedom, for he could not support freedom, but to have a new master whose 'foot-licker' he can become. He is delighted at the prospect. It would be hard to find a better [107] example of

the dependence complex in its pure state. In the play the complex must be a projection, for where else could it have come from? The dependence of colonial natives is a matter of plain fact. The ensuing encounter between the European's unconscious and a reality only too well prepared to receive its projections is in practice full of dangers. Colonials live in a less real social world, and this diminished reality is less able to wake the dreamer.... [because] he lacks the omnipotence of the father, that is to say magic, the power which is the cause of all difficulties and must be rejected. How reluctantly Prospero gives up his daughter to Ferdinand! And he cannot restore Ariel to liberty without asking him to perform yet one more task. He forgives his enemies, but only after he has avenged himself on them and thoroughly humiliated them. In Milan, where he will be duke in name only, he says, 'Every third thought shall be my grave'. In the Epilogue Prospero declares

Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
And what strength I have's mine own;
Which is most faint.

In this, his will, he gives back everything he acquired by magic-all, that is, that he lost by betrayal, including his birthright....

[108] It is always worth while considering the opinions of the colonialists, for they are necessarily very revealing, and in this case they confirm my views. What they say in effect is: there is no misunderstanding to clear up; it would not be worth the trouble, anyway; the Malagasy personality is whatever you like to make of it-for in fact it does not exist; ours alone counts. In other words, they do not acknowledge the Malagasy personality. Nothing outside themselves affects them. After all, what sorts of personalities have Miranda, Ariel, and Friday? None at all, so long as they remain submissive. Caliban, it is true, asserts himself by opposing, but he is mere bestiality.

What the colonial in common with Prospero lacks, is awareness of the world of Others, a world in which Others have to be respected. This is the world from which the colonial has fled because he cannot accept men as they are. Rejection of that world is combined with an urge to dominate, an urge which is infantile in origin and which social adaptation has failed to discipline. The reason the colonial himself gives for his flight-whether he says it was the desire to travel, or the desire to escape...

[127] Europeans born in a colony are unlike their parents. They do not as a rule suffer from an over-compensated inferiority complex, as do the parents. If the community were homogeneous, as in Europe, the parental complex would naturally tend to create in them a

permanent psychological state of inferiority. But in a colonial environment the fact of belonging to the privileged race offers easy compensations for inferiority and certainly diminishes its effects, and the children usually possess very firm and un-neurotic racial convictions, which are as much a part of their *persona* as of their unconscious. Such convictions are obviously based on the childhood experience of seeing the father exercise absolute authority over all Malagasies-an authority which to the child is unquestioned and unquestionable.' Later these children begin to feel superior even to metropolitan Europeans because they are in a better position to resolve or conceal their fundamental inferiority, because they are absolutely convinced, without any neurotic complication, of their superiority to the natives, while the Europeans have not that complete assurance, and when they become racist it is by an act of over-compensation which, like all such acts, has its drawbacks. This is an important factor on the basis of which we may predict with a fair degree of certainty that in the near future the Europeans born in Madagascar will be openly hostile towards metropolitan Europeans. Indeed, the probability is so great that it ought to be taken into account now in the formulation of political plans and projects. It may well be, from the purely psychological point of view, of course, that these Europeans get on better with the Malagasies than those who come out from Europe, because the Malagasies' dependence complex fits in with this feeling of absolute superiority more easily than [128] with the more unstable attitude of metropolitans compensating for an inferiority complex. Moreover, the Europeans born in Madagascar have a keener sense of the Malagasy psychology and know how to foster and exploit the need for dependence.

Naturally, the fact of escaping the inferiority complex so easily by taking advantage of the presence of a whole dependent people is in itself psychologically a loss. For though compensation for such a complex is fraught with dangers, the only hope of human progress lies in a vigorous and manly liquidation of inferiority. Inferiority, provided it is resolved in good time, is the main driving force of western man, and provides him with the energy which sets him apart from all other peoples in the world. It underlies almost all the life-stories of our great men. And I think it would not be over-bold to foresee in the distant future the development of a new kind of white or near-white humanity over almost the whole of the southern hemisphere of the ancient world, a type more different, psychologically, from that of the north than any of the northern peoples are from each other from east to west. If national psychologies remain as constant as appears to be the case, we can already forecast what the main characteristics of this new type will be: lack of originality and creativity, a distinct taste for feudal types of organization, and a lively desire to avoid infection from the complexes of the northern hemisphere. Long-term prophecies of this kind must, of course, be seen for what they are-namely, a way of defining our intuitions about the present situation rather than a precise forecast of an unknown future. In any case the new white or near-white (white enough at any rate not to feel inferior in the southern hemisphere) human beings I have envisaged would on

the whole be far less worthy products than are Europeans, unless as a result of having to grapple with fresh difficulties they acquired some qualities other than mere pride in the race of their birth.

Let us turn now to the Malagasy and find out what effect this 'psychological heredity' has on him.

The Malagasies who made the first settlement with their European guest—they are all dead now or too old to have any influence—[129] appear to have been fairly satisfied with the dependence relationship they established. They were accustomed to living within a system of bonds, and the new bonds were no more difficult to bear than the old—rather the contrary. They considered the presence of the European beneficial and felt that his arrival held out to them hopes of progress. Progress they conceived in terms of an increase of skills and knowledge of all kinds; they wanted to become educated, to develop their country...

The hoped-for progress has indeed been made: but not within the original emotional framework; feelings have changed, new needs have arisen, and the achievements have consequently lost almost all their affective value.

We are no doubt perfectly right in thinking that education, hygiene, and material comforts are good in themselves and that what has been accomplished so far in that direction in Madagascar is only a stage in a process which must continue. But people who lack nothing in these respects may yet be very unhappy if their personalities are disrupted or contain contradictions which they are unable to resolve. Of course it is true that these contradictions are the driving force behind all real progress and development, in Madagascar as elsewhere—not without crises, though, and sometimes very grave ones, for progress leads the Malagasy into difficulties which he is hard put to understand, and the means of resolving his doubts and perplexities are not always within his reach. Ought he to break with tradition? That would mean giving up all the bonds of dependence, [130] hence almost the whole of his family and social organization. If he were to abandon the cult of the dead he would feel like a plant cut off from its roots. He would have to pass through the painful apprenticeship to individualism. And if all the bonds were broken the Malagasies would in truth be no longer a people, but a mob. Of course that is not the way things will happen: the transformation will be neither complete nor instantaneous, and there are some bonds which will never be broken. Individuals will drop from their social niches one after another... and already we have a good idea what will happen to them: they will swell the ranks of the agents and petty traders, political agitators, labour recruiters, and so on, who represent this new type of 'uprooted' Malagasy. He is much nearer to us, psychologically speaking, than the traditional Malagasy, for he has to a large extent cast off the bonds of dependence and like us he has discovered inferiority and guilt; he has known anguish and perturbation. He may not necessarily represent the typical Malagasy of the future, but he is certainly the catalytic element which will precipitate change and development.

Paradoxically, he is unaware of the part he is playing; whereas in fact and almost in spite of himself he is helping to demolish what remains of the traditional structure, he is nevertheless reactionary in his desires and advocates a return to the old ways. It is probable that, having himself abandoned these old ways, he is suffering from unconscious feelings of guilt about it. Hence his desire for change, which makes him a disturbing element and likely to speed up the process of change among those who have up to now retained their traditional relationships. Hence also his nostalgia for the old days. So in fact he is undermining what is left standing of the edifice he longs to preserve... I think these observations are probably true of the psychology of many reactionaries the world over. It must be realized that this contradictory and dangerous attitude draws strength from complexes deep in the Malagasy unconscious, sources of energy not available to the democratic convictions of the more evolved Malagasies....

NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

THE historian, accustomed as he is to explaining great and complex events by relatively simple abstract causes, never hesitates to tackle the question of colonial nationalism, but the psychologist is shy of this delicate problem, for he feels obliged to decide either what is the exact place occupied in the personality by 'national sentiment' or what personal feelings correspond, in the individual psyche, to the nationalism of the group, and lend it their support.

The idea of a collective consciousness is hardly admissible, for it is really a contradiction in terms. The contradiction might perhaps be less glaring if we were to speak more loosely of a collective psyche. But we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by a metaphor; the collective psyche can only be apprehended through individuals; at most it is the group aspect of the individual psyche. When a writer like Keyserling states that the German nation is suffering from an inferiority complex dating back to the Thirty Years' War, we are prepared to accept his statement on one condition: that it be not impossible to perceive, theoretically, how this complex could have been passed on from generation to generation, how it originates in the child or how, in the adult, it is grafted on to an already existing inferiority complex of infantile origin, why it should take root at all, why, that is, the individual should prefer this 'national complex' to his own personal complex, and what satisfaction it is that he derives from it. We may also wonder whether the sense of inferiority resulting from the Thirty Years' War sprang directly from a national element in individual German psyches, or whether it was that the war gave rise to social conditions likely to breed a sense of inferiority without at first bringing into play strictly national elements in the psyche, and so on. Of course we are not obliged to go into such detail; we could, as Keyserling does, simply speak of an inferiority complex dating back to the Thirty Years' War and leave it at that, but we can only do so legitimately if we are sure that we could go into detail and give a full explanation; otherwise this sort of observation

132

has very little value. Similarly we should, I think, consider what, psychologically, the Malagasies' demand for national independence represents. Doubtless we shall not be able to go very far, for the nationalists have naturally not come forward for analysis, but it is possible to make a certain number of useful observations.

In the first place, we are not dealing with a desire for independence as such, for that would have expressed itself in immediate claims for more freedom for the individual, whereas the champions of independence have, on the contrary, bound themselves by pledges and taken magical oaths of the most restrictive kind possible. This is no mere perverseness; it is not the first time that there has been a contradiction between the primary desire for a certain good and the collective ideal which has formed around the concept of that good thing. Men go to prison to defend liberty, die for a better life, unite to protect individualism. However, we ought perhaps to try to analyse it.

The man who goes to prison in defence of freedom is sacrificing the primary desire for actual freedom, freedom immediate and personal, to the more distant, secondary ideal of the good of the community. We may wonder whether it is possible to form a clear idea of the relationship between the ideal which is sacrificed and that which is pursued—the psychological relationship, of course, for answers have already long ago been given in the philosophical, moral, and political spheres. Or is it perhaps simply that freedom does not mean the same thing in the two cases?

An extreme right-wing supporter believes in order, but his behaviour is such as to sow disorder everywhere. A psychologist at once asks if his behaviour is not a protest, and if so against what aspect of his personal situation, if it is not the compensatory behaviour of an asocial being who pays lip-service to a social ideal, and so makes good in his professed beliefs what he failed to find in his family upbringing. If we knew the answers to these questions we should be well on the way to discovering specific and individual explanations for certain aspects of political 'collective thinking', always provided, of course, that the individual in question could be considered typical of his group. It is only in this way, however, that we should endeavour to explain the 'collective thinking' of the Malagasies in the matter of political claims.

The first thing to notice is that for the Malagasies independence is only a means; the goal is nationalism. The Malagasies do not want a

national government in order to ensure their independence; they want sufficient independence to be able to have a national government. (A national government without independence would of course hardly warrant the name of government.) They do not expect to gain any specific advantages from this government, either material or political. And in particular they do not hope for greater personal freedom. When Europeans tell them they will gain nothing from independence, but rather the contrary, they are wasting their time; the Malagasies know it already.¹ With a Malagasy government in power there would be more arbitrariness, more corruption, more forced labour, heavier taxes, and so on. Political oppression would be greater, penalties would be more severe. All this they know, but it does not deter them.

The feelings driving them on are much less individualist and much more powerful than these deterrents—judging at least by their effects. The effects amounted to a rebellion, and a rebellion requires a vast output of energy. Whatever shady intrigues, secret pressures, selfish deals, or deliberate provocations may have precipitated the rebellion at that particular time, the fact is nevertheless that they were able to mobilize an immense reserve of psychic energy. The psychologist finds himself faced with the task of explaining how thousands of men could have courted death in conditions of combat unbelievably unfavourable to them. To bolster their courage they invented tales which they would never have put faith in for an instant in normal times. They joined battle without hope and persevered in it in spite of failure. And these were people generally supposed to be peace-loving and who are said to lack courage. The psychic energy brought into play must have been enormous. Where can it have come from?

The answer to that question is rather complicated, but one important element in it is the feeling of abandonment to which I have already referred. This feeling caused great disturbance in the minds of the Malagasies and touched off those guilt complexes which seem to be closely linked with it. At the same time, in their efforts to escape the horrors of abandonment the Malagasies endeavoured to re-establish typical dependence systems capable of satisfying their deepest needs. Finally, there are the phenomena of identification, which are difficult to investigate, but play a large part in questions of this kind.

¹ This kind of argument is a strong one to the French mind (it is somewhat anarchistic), and the French are always surprised when they meet people upon whom it makes no impression.

I shall be referring later on to the way in which the identification of a subject with a leader operates; there seems in this case to have been an identification of the individual with the group. In Europeans our acknowledgement of this identification appears to be offset by an equally conscious will to individualism. Nevertheless even the least patriotic of men, the least nationalistic, the least infected with inferiority, cannot avoid a certain degree of identification with the group to which he belongs; he is, after all, a member of it, so that even if he criticizes it or runs it down he is to some extent criticizing himself. The process of identification is no doubt necessary for the formation of a national spirit, and it may be that in Madagascar we have been witnessing the first signs of the occurrence of a process of this kind, which has up to now been unknown to the majority of Malagasies. There must clearly have been some crisis in the functioning of the security defences based on psychological dependence, an effort to restore this dependence, and a neurotic recoil from individualization, evidently combined with a bad conscience. (I shall later be quoting some passages from Dama Nisoah which are very revealing in this respect.)

How did the crisis come about? How was it that a feeling of insecurity arose at the very time when, objectively speaking, there was no outside threat to security at all? The order which the Malagasies deliberately shattered¹ when they started the rebellion guaranteed them adequate means of subsistence, if not plenty. There were difficulties, admittedly—food was not always in good supply, clothing materials were scarce—but they were negligible compared with those which disorder invited and the catastrophes which actually ensued. In accordance with a new policy, they had just been granted greater liberties and fuller guarantees; they could no longer be forced to contribute their labour² and they were given protection against

¹ The Malagasies on the east coast, that is, for the Merina nationalists did not disturb public order.

² The European public knows very little about the requisitioning of colonial workers. A wartime measure authorized the Government to requisition workers for jobs for the public benefit (which came to mean almost exclusively the upkeep of roads). The indirect beneficiaries of this measure were the white colonials, for the Malagasies rushed to sign on with them on any conditions, so as to escape Government requisition. Consequently the plantations were overstaffed; the workers did very little and were paid even less, but everyone was satisfied. At the end of the war the Government abolished the order, and the plantations immediately lost all their 'free' labour just at the time when, as a result of improved transportation and a rise in world prices, the planters saw some far years approaching.

The ideal situation for the colonial is that the administration should be severe enough to serve him as bogeyman and beater. (Generally it refrains from doing so, whence certain conflicts.) He himself would rather have *protégés* than workers; his clients do

arbitrary punishment. A Parisian socialist newspaper said that it was inconceivable that the Malagasies should have revolted against the suppression of forced labour and the *indigénat* system. Logically, of course, it seems absurd, but psychologically it cannot be dismissed so easily. The situation was intolerable to the Malagasies because, in spite of the objective security it offered them, it roused in them subjective feelings of abandonment and guilt. They felt abandoned because they could no longer be sure of authority, for the Europeans were at loggerheads among themselves. People say that internal rifts weaken a nation in the face of an outside danger. The colonial situation strikingly refutes this dictum. The Europeans themselves were not much affected by their disputes, but the natives suffered considerably as a result, especially as the disputes were about them. Some Europeans told them they were free and congratulated them; others told them that this freedom was a snare and delusion and that no good would come of it. Half the Europeans encouraged the Malagasy to do as he pleased as a free man; the other half were more hostile to him than before—their hostility being the psychological counterpart of the paternalist attitude, as we have seen. It is important to appreciate the true emotional significance to the Malagasy of the bonds of dependence in order to understand his appalling feeling of desolation on seeing these bonds snapping all around him. Moreover, the feeling reawakened his childhood sense of guilt, for guilt and fear of being abandoned by the parents are closely linked at that age.

It is noteworthy that these feelings first expressed themselves in the form of delusions and veritable hallucinations, a fact which may throw some light on the descriptions we find in ancient records of the supernatural signs which accompanied periods of unrest and of the weird portents presaging great calamities. Fear crystallizes in the form of terrifying visions. In Madagascar a number of people claimed to have seen supernatural beings. Reports of a centaur in Vaio-

not work regularly but are always on the spot, with their wives and children, ready to give a helping hand for almost nothing. That is the ideal, of course, and things are not always like this in practice, but this system is fairly widespread and accounts for the poor quality, professionally, of these so-called workers.

It can also be seen why the suppression of the requisition order provoked serious conflict between the colonials and the Government.

¹ The Europeans in Madagascar to some extent, of course, but more especially white men in general, the white population all over the world, whom the Malagasies see as a single entity. Europeans' wars amongst themselves are very disgusting to dependent peoples.

mandry¹ spread terror among the people, and they shut themselves up in their houses. Similar occurrences were reported elsewhere, and there must have been many more which were never reported, for the Europeans did not attach much importance to them; they made light of the Malagasies' panics, and so failed to profit from their implicit warning.²

Further proof of the Malagasies' extreme susceptibility to feelings of guilt, which are always bound up with fear and insecurity, is their belief in the *tody*, according to which the desire to hurt someone else rebounds upon the person guilty of the desire by virtue of a magical *lex talionis*. The root from which the word *tody*³ derives signifies return to the point of departure. Similar beliefs have doubtless been known in all countries; 'evil spirits' can be exorcised, and we talk of an 'immanent justice' which will punish 'where we have sinned'. But the exorcism of evil spirits requires a magical operation, and the idea of immanent justice is a consolation to those who are faced with obvious injustice, while the *tody*, which sees evil intentions as a kind of boomerang, dangerous to hurl because it will spring back unexpectedly, indicates an unconscious feeling of guilt, and is probably the simplest and most primitive expression of remorse.

The only alternative of remorse is resentment, accompanied by hatred and violence. Violence springs from guilt, and guilt from a feeling of abandonment.⁴ The most stubborn of the rebels were former soldiers who had come back from Europe; I have already explained what sort of influence Europe may have had on such men. It must be added that for the majority of them the army had been a system of very close-knit and numerous bonds of dependence which replaced the family and social bonds. When these men suddenly found themselves demobilized, in spite of the precautions which had been taken and which for the European would have been enough to cushion the shock, they fell into the emotional state of the abandoned. Their psychological condition was in itself enough, therefore, to lead to feelings of hostility. It remains, however, to discover how these feelings came to be expressed in open hostility, and in par-

¹ Where, a few months later, the revolt was to break out with extreme violence.

² With regard to these panics, see E. Cailliet, *Essai sur la psychologie du Hova*, pp. 17-19.

³ On the *tody*, see Cailliet, *ibid.* (from Ardantamidy: *Ny Hovitra Malagasy, in Ny Mpanolo Tantara, Antananarivo*, 1905, p. 206). Compare the meanings of the roots of the words *ody* and *tody* and their derivatives, in P. Malzac's *Malagasy dictionary*.

⁴ See Part III, Ch. IV.

they condensed around claims for national independence. The rebels had only the vaguest ideas about the meaning of independence, but they had very clear notions about what kinds of leaders they wanted; they knew them personally and referred to them by name. Political systems and constitutions meant nothing to them. They wanted these particular leaders in order to be able to restore the broken bonds of dependence which they saw no hope of re-establishing with the Europeans. They also wanted them in order to be able to identify themselves with them. And finally they wanted them in order to lay upon their shoulders—but not through harred—their painful burden of guilt.

Immediately these leaders were arrested, Malagasies who had not taken part in the revolt, but who had nevertheless unconsciously felt rather guilty for having hoped that the nationalists would win, spontaneously demanded the exemplary punishment of the men whom up to then they had looked upon as their models and heroes, without even waiting for a verdict on their actual 'guilt'. They turned their gods into victims, their heroes into scapegoats, their saints into martyrs, in accordance with an absolutely classical psychological process. Had the French authorities been 'primitive' enough themselves, had they offered the Malagasy people their own leaders as expiatory victims (while washing their hands of the whole affair), we should have seen a repetition of those emotional phenomena which occurred in another colony some twenty centuries ago when another people tried to wash away its sins in the blood of its own lamb. The Malagasy rebels, however, had no such sacrifice in their minds; they wanted only to be delivered of their feelings of guilt by the restoration of clear and firm bonds of dependence on the traditional pattern.

This, I think, is an appropriate point at which to mention the phenomena of identification with the leader. A subject always—and almost always unconsciously—identifies himself with an acclaimed and acknowledged leader. For a leader is never really recognized as such, in any country, unless the man-in-the-street has the feeling—it may be illusory, but that is immaterial—that he understands him, that he can predict what he is going to do, and that he himself would do exactly the same if he were in his place. Whatever qualities a government may have, it will please only that fraction of the population which has the same qualities. It will become popular only when the man-in-the-street has unconsciously identified himself with it and

feels that its actions are prompted by feelings akin to his own. If he cannot achieve this identification, though it is easy enough in normal times, then he projects on to it all sorts of low motives and sees it as prompted in all its actions by malice, self-interest, bad faith, and imbecility. If this sort of thing can happen in Europe, where those who govern and those who are governed are of the same nationality and have personalities of similar structure, how much more likely is it to happen in a colonial situation. True, the colonial inhabitants are not very exacting as to the conditions for identification; they were prepared to treat as father and mother governors and administrators not always worthy of that honour; but people dominated by a need for dependence cannot identify themselves with leaders who, they feel—they may be wrong, but no matter—have abandoned them. They saw nothing generous in our proposal to loosen some of their bonds of dependence, at least in the conditions in which the proposal was made, namely, after a war which had made them doubt the power of their overlords, after sharp disputes over domestic policy, and in the midst of a conflict between stern but 'tried' colonialists and politicians who, while preaching liberty, did not commit themselves in any way, had nothing either to gain or lose and remained infinitely more 'apart' from the Malagasies than the most brutal European foreman.

When the French arrived fifty years ago, the Malagasies did not receive them indifferently in the way people might, say, accept a new employer or a new justice of the peace; their feelings were much warmer, and the French, responding in their fashion, unwittingly created a situation which, though satisfactory to them, was in fact based on a complete misunderstanding. Many changes have taken place since then. To-day the Malagasy wants to project upon us his shortcomings and his ill intentions; he wants to find other leaders with whom to identify himself. We can no longer comfort ourselves with the thought that we are leading our colonial protégés slowly but surely along the path of progress towards a remote but accessible ideal: that of civilization, assimilation, emancipation. . . . For the Malagasies say that they are still following this path, but with other leaders; they do not want us any more. They no longer reproach us for imposing our civilization upon them; they now accuse us of withholding it from them, of barring the path we opened up for them. It is a political reversal—of that there is no doubt—but the political is simply a reflection of the psychological reversal, for at