

menace. If this is true, our only hope is that still further development will eventually diminish the peril in these areas.

In the lands where the internal threat of communism is already great, as it is in most of Asia, we can perhaps assume that technological advances will serve to lessen rather than increase the danger. On the other hand, we cannot be certain that, even with our aid, these countries will be able to win the race with their populations, and we must realize that in any case the development of an economy capable of providing enough food for all and adequate levels of education will be a long and slow process. Under optimum conditions it may be many decades before a country like Indonesia can achieve living standards and educational levels comparable to those of Japan. Long before any of the new democracies have got that far, even with maximum aid from us, they will have had to face the crucial tests of deciding between rival policies and leaders and perhaps other severe challenges to their shaky democratic institutions. Economic and technical aid alone will certainly not decide the war between democracy and totalitarianism. It can be a potent weapon for the democratic side, but many fateful decisions in Asia will have been made long before it has produced any decisive results.

Since the military arm of policy is so limited in scope and the economic so slow and uncertain in action, we are forced to turn to the third implement of strategy, the ideological. In many ways this is the most important of the three. If the peoples of Asia realized the impossibility of true equality for Asian nations in a Communist world, if they were fully aware of the inevitable slavery of man to the machine of government in any totalitarian system, the problem of defending Asia from communism would in-

deed be a simple one. In fact, the military and economic arms of policy are in a sense purely subsidiary to the ideological. Through the military arm we can defend some selected spots, but this does us more harm than good if the people in those areas do not elect to use the time bought by our blood to work toward the development of a healthy democracy. Through economic aid we can give the people of an Asian country a better fighting chance to develop democratic institutions, but our economic aid, if they so decide, could be used with equal effectiveness to lay the foundations for a totalitarian regime. Without the support of the military and economic arms, our ideological efforts might prove entirely ineffective, but without the ideological side the other two become almost meaningless.

In the case of China we can see with particular clarity this priority of the ideological over the other two arms of policy. Certainly the Russians exercised much less military power in the Chinese area than we did. This is not to say that their military aid was not of the greatest importance to the Chinese Communists. The Russians permitted their Chinese followers to get hold of the great bulk of Japanese weapons captured by the Soviet forces in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and their carefully timed movements in Manchuria were effectively designed to give the local Communists the best possible chance to take over this important region. But Russian military aid to the Communists was in the aggregate much less than the military aid we gave Chiang. In accepting the Japanese surrender we used our forces in a way that would ensure Chiang's getting hold of the vital coastal cities of China; we transported his troops to the north; we trained some of his divisions; we furnished him with military advisers and instructors; and we gave him not only all the Japanese weapons surrendered to us in China but also huge quantities of our own equipment. It is true that subsequently

we may have contributed to the collapse of the military efficiency and morale of the Kuomintang by withholding further military equipment, but all in all we exerted far greater military influence in Chiang's behalf than the Russians did in aid of Mao.

On the economic side the situation is even clearer. The economic aid the Soviet Union gave the Chinese Communists before their complete triumph was at best negligible and did not begin to offset the Russian plundering of Manchuria. Obviously underrating their Chinese adherents and expecting the Kuomintang to win out, the Russians decided to strip Manchuria bare of virtually all its movable industrial equipment, even though much of it was of no value when finally deposited in Siberia. Russia thus robbed its Chinese allies of the principal assets of the part of China that fell to them in the scramble following the Japanese surrender and left Mao with a very delicate issue to explain away to his patriotic countrymen. In contrast, we took nothing from China, but poured out literally billions of dollars in goods and financial backing for the tottering Kuomintang, though all to no avail.

We exerted far more military effort in China than the Russians; we gave economic aid, while they were plundering Manchuria; but the Communists outdid us on the third level and won. The ideological war went to them, in large part by default, as more and more Chinese came to the conclusion that communism represented the only or at least the best hope for a united and strong China. While we strengthened the arms of the Chinese and attempted to fill their bellies, the Communists won their minds and of course along with their minds got their arms and bodies too. If countries like India or Indonesia go Communist, it will almost certainly be in the same way. The Russians, even with the support of their Chinese converts, are not likely to surpass us in military efforts in these regions,

much less in economic aid. But they have shown themselves all too capable of outdoing us on the crucial level of ideas.

We have not been completely unmindful in recent years of the ideological phase of the problem in Asia. There has been much talk in the United States of psychological warfare, but the term itself is a most unfortunate one and a good illustration of our own ineptness in this field. The aggressive tone of such a term perhaps has done as much to undermine our cause as has been accomplished by the programs under its name.

We seem to have been most successful in the realm of ideas when least self-conscious. Members of technical-assistance missions, as a by-product of their projects, have often done much to foster the growth of democratic ideals and practices, though usually at such low grass-roots levels that their work will affect the central governments only very indirectly and slowly. Even more has been done altogether unwittingly by thousands of unofficial ambassadors of democracy. For example, the strong egalitarian spirit and democratic idealism of the first waves of combat troops we sent into Japan at the close of the Second World War did more to convince the Japanese of the sincerity and strength of our democratic beliefs than did all the preachment of our high command in Tokyo.

Our formal programs designed for the ideological level of the cold war in Asia have been extremely limited in extent and feeble in accomplishment. The Voice of America, even in its heyday in Asia, was of much less value than in Europe. Very few Asians had the short-wave radios with which to listen in, if they had wished, and still fewer were likely to have been influenced by our amateurish efforts. The work of cultural attachés at our embassies has been very restricted and has often received only halfhearted support. This has usually been considered the

least important of an embassy's tasks—the diplomatic end of the line.

American libraries in major Asian cities have often been of great value, though they have been little patronized where they were needed most, and their limitation to American authors or American subject matter has created the unfortunate impression that we are interested in the Americanization of Asian lands rather than in their democratization. Worse still, the harm from world-wide publicity given to the purging of allegedly undesirable books in these libraries—that is, "book-burning" in the lurid phraseology of the world press—may have more than outweighed the good they have done over the years.

Something has been achieved in the ideological field through government programs for bringing Asian students to the United States, although technical assistance has usually been our chief motive. Even in this activity, however, the results are probably much more equivocal than is usually supposed. The foreign student anywhere and at any time, if poorly treated or if given a training that fails to meet his needs after he returns home, can easily react against the country where he studied and against its ideals. The ranks of our enemies in Asia are full of returned students from the United States and Europe. On the whole our fellowship programs for Asian students have undoubtedly been a good thing, but they could be made a great deal better if we put a little more effort and imagination into them.

While we have paid lip service to the importance of ideas by creating a few feebly supported and freely criticized programs, we have shown an utter disregard of this arm of strategy in our Asian diplomacy as a whole. We tread unconsciously on toes made sensitive by colonialism and long inequality of status. Some of our senators and congressmen are interested only in making statements

that will sound satisfyingly tough to the homefolk, no matter how unsympathetic or idiotic they may sound to Asian ears. Even the members of our State Department, in their understandable though deplorable fear of publicity-conscious members of Congress, have often shown themselves more sensitive to the mere whims of American legislators than to the deepest convictions or most serious prejudices of the Asians with whom they should be dealing. Our net score in the field of ideas is well below zero.

We have been presenting our case in Asia in terms that may be gratifying to the frustrated and somewhat bewildered citizen of Newark or Sacramento and in doing so have often hit upon terms that seem diabolically calculated to alienate Asians from our side. For example, in approaching Asians who are immensely wary about Western domination and almost exclusively concerned with their own tremendous problems, we often imply that they first must pick up a gun and fight on our side before the relationship goes any farther. Because of our order of priority we seem to them callously indifferent to their interests and very possibly bent on creating some new form of military imperialism. It would be hard to find a better way to ensure their unwillingness to stand up and be counted on our side.

Much of the ideological war fought by the Communists in Asia is devoted to defaming us rather than persuading others of the rightness of their cause. It is certainly easier to exploit negative prejudices than to build up positive beliefs. The Communists have done a most effective job in sowing dark suspicions about the United States in Asian minds and in presenting our culture and ideals in the worst possible light. We, on the other hand, have proved very inept at convincing Asians about the terrible realities of the Communist system, perhaps because we

have assumed that all this was so self-evident it needed no explanation. Instead we have gone weakly over to the defensive, attempting to explain away in singularly ineffective fashion the Communist charges. Russian cunning and American ineptness made it possible for one shipment of Soviet wheat to have a larger impact on Indian thinking than forty times as much wheat provided by the United States on much more generous terms. We have even allowed the Communists to appropriate the name of democracy for themselves so that to many Asians they seem to be the champions and we the enemies of democracy.

Often enough we have played naïvely into Communist hands. For example, the Indians, who pride themselves on their spirituality, have been given a picture of the United States as the land of mammon, and we obligingly helped out the plot with our brash pride in having the tallest buildings in the world, the largest wheat fields, and the most automobiles, without stopping to ask ourselves if this is all we have to offer to countries that may never be able to attain these specific physical assets.

In so far as the ideological war has not gone against us in Asia, it has been despite rather than because of our efforts. In a country like India the ideological strength of democracy is to be attributed largely to the British education of the leadership rather than to anything we have done. Indonesian leaders, who like to think of themselves as the George Washingtons of their country, may at the same time subscribe to the belief that the once admirable American democracy of Revolutionary times has been going steadily downhill ever since.

In America the business of influencing men's minds, particularly to buy cigarettes or cars or some other product, has become a tremendous and presumably successful undertaking. No people in the world show a greater desire to "win friends and influence people." But at the

same time no major nation in recent years has been less successful than the United States in communicating information or ideas to peoples beyond its borders. Either we have entirely ignored this problem or, as seems more likely, we have foolishly assumed that techniques that have proved successful for selling toothpaste in America will prove adequate for the ideological war in Asia.

At the ideological level the United States often appears to be engaged in a game of diplomatic giveaway. The Russians with their dogmatic rigidity and the horrible realities of their system are constantly making prodigious blunders that alienate large numbers of thinking Asians. But then we come along, with our complete disregard of the psychology of Asian peoples, and match the Russian blunders with some statement or action which may look good in Peoria but has a very sinister or incredible appearance in New Delhi. The truth is all on our side, and unlike the Russians we need not be fettered by a narrow, rigid orthodoxy of thought. It is indeed disheartening to see us constantly nullifying all these important and conceivably decisive advantages.

We are a practical people, but we have shown our practicality in Asia by a curious inversion of values. The military arm of policy is the most costly and in the long run probably the least effective, but since its accomplishments are easily understood, we have poured most of our energies and resources into this single type of activity. The economic arm also is rather costly and works only slowly and uncertainly, but as it too produces concrete results, we have been willing to devote considerable effort to it, even if not enough. The ideological arm is by all odds the least costly and at the same time probably the most effective, but as its results are hard to measure exactly and always remain somewhat intangible, we have chosen to ignore it almost completely, thereby minimizing

the effectiveness of our vast expenditures for the military arm and our large outlays for the economic. All three implements of strategy must be used if we are to have much hope for success in Asia, but of the three the ideological is probably the most essential. We have spent billions of dollars for military activities in Asia and hundreds of millions for economic aid, but we have begrudged a few million dollars for the ideological aspect of strategy and have been even less willing to devote to it the necessary human energy and intellectual effort. If this is practicality, it is the hardheaded practicality of the dinosaur.

11. *Our Arsenal of Ideas*

When Hitler threw down the gauntlet to the democracies in Europe, the arsenal that the United States was forced to prepare to meet this challenge consisted of military weapons. Today in the European sphere of our problems, Moscow's challenge to human freedom has again forced us to build up our military strength. But in Asia, where only a few small sectors along the line of battle can be held by arms, ideas are the most powerful weapons in our potential arsenal of democracy.

It is most unfortunate that we have tended to ignore the ideological arm of strategy in Asia, but it is not surprising. As a people we, like the British, are inclined to approach our problems through pragmatic experiment rather than abstract theorizing. Democracy is not a theory with us so much as a practical way of living. The American feels and acts in an essentially democratic way, but he has little experience in describing his beliefs and feelings in words. If challenged to state his faith, he may resort to certain symbols of it. He might even cite the corner

drugstore or hot dogs at a baseball game, for these particular institutions, however mystifying to others, signify for him the democratic equalities and freedoms of American life.

We have no authoritative verbal statements of our modern democratic beliefs and practices. Our great democratic documents date far back in our history, and it is merely practical experience that has kept these documents alive in changing times and has transformed us from a late-eighteenth-century society into a mid-twentieth-century democracy—practical experience in court rulings, in state and national legislation, and most of all in ordinary community living. British democracy exists without any formal constitution describing its nature. What a contrast to Marx's great political bible and the constantly shifting redefinitions of its approved meaning, to which all Communists must blindly adhere, whatever the realities may be! Even the fascist totalitarians of Germany and Japan felt the need for official definitions of their faiths, though they turned out to be peculiarly rambling and self-contradictory.

It is certainly better that most Americans act democratically rather than just talk fluently about democracy. Our innate suspicion of theory and our insistence on practical results have contributed greatly to the strength of our democracy at home. At the same time, these characteristics have sometimes proved to be liabilities abroad. We have overlooked how extremely important words can be to people in some other parts of the world. We have been unable to believe that for many, and especially for the educated elite of Asia, theories may speak more loudly than facts.

The Communists come to Asia with a set of theories to explain away all Asian perplexities; we arrive with complex patterns of action that, instead of being self-ex-

planatory as we assume, sometimes add to the bewilderment. The Communists come with a message of hope: do these simple things and Utopia will be achieved in short order. We have an even greater message of hope than they, but we are more inclined to display our strong pragmatic skepticism to Asians, who in their desperation need assurance rather than doubt.

Our disregard of ideological factors has often made us insensitive to the Asian point of view and correspondingly slow to mold our actions to the needs of the situation there. When we insist, as some of us do, on judging everything everywhere, on the basis of what people think and do here in the United States, we are carrying our pragmatism to a self-defeating extreme. For us at home the way people think and act in Chicago or Middletown may count most, but when we come to the problems of Asian policy, the attitudes and ways of life of the people of Calcutta or the countless peasant villages of Indonesia should count even more.

Even when we have attempted to employ ideological weapons in Asia, we have often shown extraordinary ineptness in their selection and use. For example, we appear to have assumed that our chief objective is to "sell America." The term "sell" is bad enough, for it suggests that the difference between what we advocate and what is offered by communism is like the difference between brands of cars or toothpaste, marvelously magnified by smooth sales talk, but trifling in actuality. Worse, however, is the assumption that it is primarily America that we are trying to "sell."

It would naturally be gratifying to have the United States liked and admired throughout Asia and would greatly facilitate our immediate relations with that part of the world, but such popularity would have little meaning if our admirers were at the same time succumbing to

Communist subversion. It would be far better for them to dislike us heartily, if at the same time they had the political and economic strength to resist communism. Anti-American sentiments in England are of small account so long as the British see clearly and realistically the Communist challenge to democracy. Anti-Americanism in France or Italy is chiefly of concern to us because it may further undermine the weak internal resistance to communism in those countries. Similarly the attitude of Asian peoples toward the United States is of major importance to us only in so far as it affects the outcome of the great struggle between democracy and communism. Our goal is not to win an international popularity contest but to preserve from mortal peril the free way of life both for nations and for individuals.

"The American way of life" is a convenient term, especially on the Fourth of July, for suggesting all that we feel to be best in a free society and in democratic political institutions. But it is not an adequate or desirable description of democracy for Asians. Their hope, and ours as well, is that democracy will become as much theirs as ours and will then be best described as "the Indian way of life" or "the Japanese way of life." Under these circumstances "the American way of life" can only signify for them the American departures from what they hope to achieve—in other words, those aspects of American life which are physically unattainable for them or which they feel to be undesirable. What appeal could "the American way of life" have if one chose to equate this term, as many Asians do, with such things as McCarthyism or the less desirable aspects of our race relations, rather than with the many more typical things of which we have a right to be proud.

Actually "the American way of life" is a term used only by the most naïve of our politicians in speaking to

Asians, but what little ideological effort we have made in Asia has often been characterized by an "American way of life" psychology. Our programs have been designed to present the American story to Asians. Our libraries in Asia consist primarily of books by American authors or about America. Naturally the problems and achievements of the United States are a very relevant part of the ideological struggle in Asia. But so also are the terrible realities of life in Communist lands, and perhaps the most relevant body of information may be found in the problems and successes of those democratic nations which do not contrast quite as sharply with Asia in basic economic conditions as does the United States. To the extent that we identify democracy exclusively with the United States, we are actually undermining our cause in Asia, for then we make democracy seem hopelessly unattainable.

There is another good reason for consciously underplaying America in our intellectual dealings with Asians. As the richest and most powerful nation of the world we have inevitably become the primary target for natural human jealousies and resentments. If something is wrong anywhere, it is easiest to blame us. We must accept this situation with what grace we can muster, for it is a natural concomitant of our world leadership. This is something we should be able to understand, since we ourselves found considerable satisfaction not so long ago in criticizing the British Empire, while taking full advantage of the *Pax Britannica*.

The rise of British popularity in the world and the decline of our own are basically a sign of the shifting responsibility for leadership from them to us. We should recognize that the United States cannot expect to be the most appealing symbol of democracy's cause in Asia. The Japanese like to imagine a special affinity with the French, in part perhaps because they can in this way share vicari-

ously in the violent French criticism of the United States. The Indians or Burmese find close association with the British more desirable than with us. We should recognize and accept this situation. Certainly the United Kingdom is an admirable democratic ideal for Indians, and the strong spirit of independence of the individual Frenchman, if not the economics and politics of the French collectively, a desirable pattern for the Japanese. Our ideological efforts in Asia would almost certainly be more effective if we put less stress on ourselves and a great deal more on the other democracies of the world.

The big guns of the democratic arsenal in Asia, however, are not the national patterns of specific Western nations, but the ideals and practices of democracy itself. If we could help Asians to comprehend these fully, the battle would be all but won. Moreover, if we ourselves had a clearer understanding of the basic principles of democracy, we would find it much easier to handle the undeniably ticklish problem of information about America in Asia. No matter how much we underplay the American theme, it will inevitably be a major motif in our intellectual contacts with Asians, simply because basic Communist strategy emphasizes the denigration of the United States through the now familiar technique of the big lie. The attack must be answered and a truer picture of the United States substituted for it.

Our first problem is to answer specific criticisms, which usually are aimed at our weakest points. Take for example the race problem, on which we are very vulnerable in Asian eyes and which consequently is exploited unceasingly by all our enemies. Here undeniably is a gross imperfection in our society. Throughout history serious problems have usually arisen wherever people of different physical type or even of different cultural background have lived together on the same land. This universal hu-

man problem has been posed in particularly acute form in the United States, where the white man and the Negro, two radically different physical types, lived together in the relationship of master and slave less than a century ago. In the intervening years we have moved far and fast from this entirely undemocratic relationship between the two races, and our progress apparently has been accelerating in recent decades. Actually the most significant fact about race relations in America is that they have been changing rapidly for the better.

We need not beat our breasts in self-condemnation, particularly before Asians who have often shown comparable racial intolerance. The whole Indian caste system, for example, may well have grown out of some form of racial discrimination; the Chinese have never accepted neighboring peoples as full equals; and the Japanese only recently became absurdly disturbed over the defilement of the Japanese race by a few thousand Eurasian offspring of GI fathers. Race relations undeniably constitute a major weakness in American society, and we have many other imperfections. We should not attempt to conceal these flaws. Instead, we should help Asians see them in proper perspective and in terms of the progress that we are making toward their correction in keeping with democratic ideals. If we could do this, these weaknesses in American society might be turned from major liabilities into virtual assets in our ideological efforts in Asia.

A clear understanding of the basic principles of democracy would also help us to see what in our society we can most validly point to with pride. We have often singled out incidental or purely American accomplishments of our democracy rather than those fundamentals that we share with others. We have been particularly unwise in emphasizing the material wealth of the United States, which we so easily do both with conscious smug-

ness and unconscious arrogance. In a country like India such an emphasis strengthens prejudices against our supposed materialism. Moreover, our wealth is certainly not to be attributed solely to our own virtues. It is in large part due to the natural resources of the land in which we live. In this respect it represents the inequalities of human birth, rather than the equalities on which democracy is based.

What we can be really proud of is not our national wealth as such but its wide and equitable distribution. It is a wonderful thing that most Americans can afford to have vacuum cleaners and washing machines, but we should be proud not so much of the high standard of living these represent as of the reason that lies behind the development and wide use of such household appliances, for they are a clear reflection of the fact that few Americans are so rich or so poor that the one group can hire the services of the other for menial labor.

While the principles of democracy are in themselves potent ideological weapons in Asia, pure theory alone is not enough. Communism too has its allegedly "democratic" ideals, which by departing entirely from Communist realities have maintained considerable appeal for those who do not understand the discrepancy. Communism also offers an immediately practical means of political organization anywhere in Asia, whereas democratic procedures of operation are, for the time being, more or less inapplicable in many Asian lands. It makes little difference that Communist practices will not lead to the achievement of Communist ideals, for the convert may not discover this until it is too late to adopt another course. If we are to meet communism on the ideological plane in Asia, we must have not only high ideals and objectives but also practical means of achieving them.

In the past we have tended to assume that the slow

tion and opinion and that efforts will be made to achieve compromises and agreements through argument and debate.

Communists and other totalitarians raise dikes at home against the inflow of ideas and attempt to pour their poisons abroad through underground channels. The free nations believe in an open and unhampered exchange of ideas and influences. In fact, each diplomat, each missionary or swami, each lecturer or teacher who goes abroad, does so with the express intention of exerting some influence on the people to whom he has gone. Each Point Four dollar is expected to change something in the land in which it is used. We and almost all other peoples are up to our necks in the business of exerting influence internally in other countries, and if we have not realized this before, it is time to give it some clear thought now.

American missionaries have gone in large numbers to Asia for well over a century with absolutely no compunctions about changing the religious beliefs or social customs of the people they found there. Our businessmen have been active for an equally long time in Asia with no thought about the economic dislocations or gradual social changes that resulted from their work. What policy our government has had toward Asia has largely been the insistence that our missionaries and traders should have as wide a scope as possible for their activities. In fact, American naval strength was used to win them this opportunity in Japan, and American marines and naval units were stationed for long in China to protect our citizens in their varied enterprises. In other words, our government has insisted that individual Americans be given every possible opportunity to influence the thought and mores of Asians.

While all this may seem perfectly natural and innocuous to us, probably no other single group of outsiders proved more subversive to the traditional regimes and in-

situations of Asia than American missionaries. They taught an ethical system that was not compatible with native concepts and institutions; they introduced ideas that were not only subversive to the native political regimes but ate away at the roots of the whole society; on top of this they helped supply the technological foundations for revolution in Asia—English, the language for contact with the outside world, new educational systems, Western medical and scientific knowledge, even such things as improved agricultural techniques. Our missionaries were as much revolutionaries in Asia as any Communist agents, whether they realized it or not. So also were all the other Americans who went to Asia for business, diplomacy, or merely pleasure. Each, whether by undermining the traditional economy, by demonstrating new techniques of operation, by illustrating new social or ethical attitudes, or by advocating new ideas, made his contribution, great or small, to the cataclysmic transformation of Asia.

The Asian revolution is in reality our revolution, fostered, however unconsciously, by the democratic principles of the Western world. It is our democracy that represents the great challenge to traditional Asian political institutions, not the revived absolutism of communism, which for Asia is the old authoritarian system bolstered up by new and terrible totalitarian techniques. Our free society is the great challenge to traditional Asian society, not the manacled equality and uniformed, strutting hierarchy of Russia. Our concepts of individual prosperity are the great challenge to Asian poverty, not the misery of the Communist masses under the bloated, all-powerful state. Democracy is what Asians hope to achieve. Communism represents the failure of these hopes, a partial reversion to the least desirable aspects of the old system. To put it in the terms of the Marxist, communism is the

counter-revolution of the democratic revolution of Asia.

If the alternative to democracy today were some traditional system quite innocuous in itself or to other nations, we might with good reason hesitate to tamper with it. In the nineteenth century, when Asia counted so little in world affairs, we might have paused to consider the desirability of the blatantly revolutionary activity we of the democratic West were conducting in Asia. But in the middle of the twentieth century, when the revolution we heedlessly started is already in full swing and its outcome is so important for the future of all mankind, it will scarcely benefit Asians or ourselves if we now hang back from the battle in self-doubt. The Communists have long since entered it with full consciousness of what they were doing. It is high time we realized that we are on the offensive for democracy and a free society in Asia. We owe it to the Asians as well as to ourselves not to abandon the revolution halfway but to help carry through as vigorously as possible toward its full realization, past the tragic Communist compromise with the past and on to real democracy.

One may wonder why, if we ourselves did so much to start the Asian revolution, it has not always kept closer to our own pattern. The question is frequently phrased in more specific terms by disillusioned Americans: "How could the Chinese have gone Communist after all that our missionaries did for them?" This is an entirely valid question, and the answer to it may have considerable bearing on our position throughout Asia.

The missionary often sought to abstract his religion or more narrowly his theology from the whole society in which he lived. Even this partial presentation of the Western challenge proved extremely destructive to the traditional societies of Asia, helping to undermine essential timbers in the whole structure. The missionary also

helped to provide the tools and techniques of the revolution. But he failed to offer an overall design. Political, social, and economic organization he usually felt to be at most peripheral to his interests. He offered a limited revolution, primarily in religion and secondarily in social organization, education, and sometimes even medicine and agriculture. Asians, however, soon became involved in a total revolution. It is not surprising that most of them accepted many of the elements of the missionary's teaching but looked elsewhere for a more comprehensive plan that embraced the totality of their lives. The missionary's underestimation of what he was doing may explain why the Christian schools of Asia have produced their full share of Communist leaders. We Americans might more validly be blamed for seeking to change too little in Asia than for attempting to change too much.

Much the same lesson can be learned from our recent experience in the occupation of Japan and South Korea. In Japan, because of our exaggerated wartime concept that all Japanese society was thoroughly evil, we showed no reluctance to use our temporary authority to the maximum to mold Japanese society into a more democratic shape. We did not stop at the political level, but wisely decided to delve deeply into the economic and social substructure. For example, we stripped the very wealthy of most of their possessions; we divided the land almost equally among those who actually farmed it; and we insisted on strict legal equality for women and greater freedom for youth. The vigor and thoroughness of our actions were in part the result of misconceptions, and our impatient disregard of certain democratic safeguards was unjustified and unwise. But, despite these mistakes, our strong offensive for democracy proved vastly more successful than our more defensive pose in Japan in recent years. During the early postwar years in Japan, MacArthur

played the role not only of the most radical American revolutionary of modern times but also of the most successful.

The case of Korea presents a sad contrast to Japan. Lacking any strong emotional reason for taking positive action, we exercised our authority there with diffidence. The Koreans were in desperate need of leadership and help, and the responsibility for supplying these was ours, since we had freed Korea. But we were slow to develop any positive policies and failed to provide the strong leadership that was needed to help the new nation off to a sound start toward democracy and real independence.

Postwar Korea and Japan, of course, were very unusual cases. Most of Asia consists of independent nations where we have no special responsibilities of this sort and exert no authority. Here we face the problems of relations between full equals, with which we feel more at ease. In these countries there is no call for us to demonstrate the type of forceful leadership we displayed in Japan and failed to provide in Korea, but this does not mean that we need have any compunctions about exerting by persuasion whatever beneficial influence we can.

Actually we cannot help exerting great influence whether we intend to or not. When the Indonesians were struggling with the Dutch for their independence, we at times sought to exert no influence on the outcome, thereby certainly not aiding the Dutch in their difficult adjustment to the postwar situation and positively harming the Indonesians, who were in sore need of our encouragement and aid. By attempting to exert no influence on the outcome we may in fact have had a generally bad influence on the situation. A nation as powerful as the United States cannot but exert an influence on every issue in the world. It is better that we realize this clearly and then exert our influence positively and wisely.

Some Americans, however, failing to comprehend this point, are subject to a strange embarrassment about seeking to influence others—an embarrassment which, it might be emphasized, the Communists never feels. But this apparent modesty may be merely a form of inverted snobbery, implying either that Asians and we are such different breeds that our respective experiences can be of no value to each other or else that we in our supposed perfection stand so far above them in their imperfection that there can be no comparison between our problems. Both assumptions are of course nonsense and are nothing more than the revival of Kipling's "East is East" in a new guise.

One of the chief appeals of communism in Asia is its recognition that the fundamental problems of human life are the same everywhere. The Communists, however, are entirely wrong in assuming that these problems can be best met, not by a free exchange of knowledge and experience, but by dictation from a single source. And the modest noninterventionist is equally wrong when he looks for independent solutions to the problems of humanity in culturally isolated national units. We are far more likely to achieve satisfactory solutions through a free exchange of ideas and influences than if we all shut ourselves up into idea-tight national compartments. Even if it were theoretically possible today for humanity to withdraw into such mutually exclusive cultural castles, the result would be a stagnating international caste system, not a democratic society of free nations.

There is one thing, however, that no free society, whether national or international, can tolerate, and that is compulsion. This is the most vital line of distinction between ourselves and the Communists. They certainly believe in persuasion, particularly in the form of intellectually numbing propaganda, but when persuasion fails, they insist on using force. In fact, force and persuasion

rattled happily along in English, unaware of what was in his mind.

Worst of all, our exclusive reliance on English raises strong psychological barriers to real understanding. I have often noticed that a Japanese speaking to me in his own language talks much more freely and directly than when restricted to English, and that the resultant exchange of ideas is greatly facilitated by increased clarity and also by a greater emotional sense of equality and reciprocity. The same, I feel certain, must be true of all Asians except for the very small number of persons whose education has been primarily through the medium of a Western language. By speaking the Asian's tongue we have not only more chance of achieving an intellectual meeting of minds with him but also, by this demonstration of our interest in him, a better chance of clearing away the emotional barriers between us. Unquestionably we shall be far more effective in communicating with Asians when there are adequate numbers of Americans who can meet them halfway linguistically.

While the language problem itself is difficult enough, a more complex and important problem in communication is that of translating our ideas into comprehensible and appealing idiom, regardless of the language used. As we have seen, "the American way of life" is a good term for describing democracy only in the United States itself. Similarly many other of our pet phrases need something more than simple word-for-word translation before they can be used effectively in Asia.

Take for example the term "free enterprise." For us this implies freedom from the stultifying restrictions of the bureaucratic super-state. It suggests a healthy and altogether desirable freedom for all men on their own initiative to work for their common good and not simply to serve as cogs in a ponderously inefficient machine of state

in which only a handful of men at the very top can show any true initiative. Not unnaturally we emphasize the blessings of "individualism" in our war with those political systems that enslave the faceless masses to the will of a few rulers. But both "free enterprise" and "individualism" suggest entirely different concepts to most Asians. These terms raise before their eyes the picture of the ruthless monopolist, the economic gouger, the foreign or native exploiter of the economic ills of colonial Asia. Where we take for granted that free enterprise and individualism will find expression within the necessary limits imposed by law and custom in behalf of the common good, the Asian may assume that they are symbols of the disregard of all social conscience. Obviously terms such as these cannot be used safely in Asia, and the ideas behind them must be translated into some other idiom.

Successful communication, however, is not merely a matter of finding suitable equivalents for our words. Beyond this it requires an adjustment to the ideas in the mind of the other person. In Asia as in Europe a great many people who have little or no sympathy for communism are strong believers in socialism, and in many Asian countries these socialist sympathizers are either the dominant or a very important group in the intellectual and political life of the nation. We shall have small success in communicating with these people if we stick stubbornly to the vocabulary dictated by our own prejudices against socialism. As we have seen, there are many reasons why so many Asians have this theoretical addiction to socialism, and their attitude is likely to change only slowly at best. In the meantime we should certainly attempt to understand their point of view and put our arguments in such form as to be comprehensible and emotionally appealing to them.

When the American public was not yet vitamin-

conscious, the advertiser of breakfast cereals could rely on assertions of the yumminess of his product or the delightful sound it made when coming into contact with milk. But when the public became interested in vitamins, the advertiser turned to citing with pride the full list of vitamins and the microscopic quantities of minerals that his product presumably had always possessed. The analogy is admittedly far-fetched, but we might, in the light of the theories and prejudices of the Asian socialist, re-examine democracy as we understand it and as it is exemplified in the United States to see what vitamins of socialistic theory it may possess.

Actually if we were to do this, we might find that we have vastly more to offer the socialist-minded Asian than either he or we have imagined. Take for example the socialist ideal of a classless society. Where does one find the closest approximation to a classless society today? Very probably in the United States, rather than in the various lands of Europe or Asia, whether they be socialist, Communist, or neither.

Despite the great American mixture of races and of peoples with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds, our society has not divided itself up into various clear-cut strata like those of both Europe and Asia. We have our quota of snobs of all varieties, but no category of Americans who are recognized as aristocrats by anybody but themselves. Similarly, except for recent immigrants, we have no large body of Americans who consider themselves a lower class. There are of course great differences in wealth, power, and prestige among individual Americans, but the great majority of them feel no inherent sense of inferiority to any other group and, when asked to classify themselves, have usually considered themselves part of an all-embracing middle class.

The contrast with almost all other parts of the world

is marked. It is hard for Americans to comprehend the strong feelings of class that remain in Europe as well as throughout Asia. We have only to look at the costumes of the Soviet officials and officers to see how strong is the Russian sense of class and how the Communist Revolution has resulted in a reshuffling rather than an abolition of classes. The high proportion of domestic servants in other lands is in a sense a symbol of their class societies. The petty intellectual in Europe or Asia, who may declaim on the merits of the classless socialist society, assumes that he himself will have servants, while the corresponding American, who may declaim as violently against socialism, takes his lack of domestic servants for granted and would be embarrassed to find himself in the position of either master or servant. If a classless society is desirable and Americans have shown by their lives that they believe this far more fundamentally than those who mouth the term most, then America can pride itself on being the country that has come closest to achieving this socialist ideal.

Another basic socialist concept is that individuals should contribute to society according to their abilities and be rewarded according to their needs. It seems doubtful that this particular ideal will ever be fully realized by human beings, but certainly it is not even being approximated in Communist lands, where rigid controls from the top keep all but the most hardy and fortunate from contributing to their full ability, and where the needs of the masses are interpreted by one harsh scale and the needs of the rulers by a much more generous standard.

On the other hand, the United States, without ever using this slogan, has come closer to achieving it than almost any other country. Nowhere in the world is it easier for an individual, regardless of his background, to make his maximum contribution to society, for nowhere else

will be find greater educational opportunities and fewer social or economic barriers in his way. And nowhere in the world is there a smaller proportional difference between the rewards accorded the unskilled worker, the skilled worker, the educated technician, and the manager or owner, in ascending order of income. Where the junior engineer, the schoolteacher, or the petty bureaucrat in most of Asia will receive an income much higher than that of the skilled worker and many times greater than that of the unskilled worker, such persons in the United States are lucky to receive anything more than the skilled worker or even an appreciably greater salary than the unskilled laborer.

It is also the American tradition for a man to work harder and longer the higher he stands on the ladder of prestige and power. Regardless of wealth an American who has not reached the age of retirement is ashamed to be without a job. There is probably less leisure per capita among those in the upper levels of our society than among those in the middle or lower levels. This situation, together with our lack of class feeling, has inevitably given to American culture a certain plebeian tone. We have of course music, literature, art, and entertainment designed for the minority with a broad education and cultivated tastes, but this is quantitatively outweighed by music, literature, art, and entertainment designed to meet the needs of Americans of less discriminating tastes. We should be proud of this rather than apologetic. It simply illustrates that leisure for us is not the monopoly of a relatively narrow aristocracy, bourgeoisie, or officialdom. Proportionately the common man plays a much larger role in our culture than in the more aristocratic societies of the rest of the world. Ours is the culture of the classless society. It is an irony that those who are loudest in criticizing

ing it are often those most enthusiastically dedicated to the creation of that very classless society.

We may have advanced as far as we have toward the achievement of these supposedly socialist ideals because we were largely unconscious of what we were doing. Certainly our progress in this direction owes little to socialist theory and nothing to socialist catch-phrases. On the contrary, we tend to be strongly anti-socialist, because we identify by this term not these commendable achievements but rather a system in which there is so much centralized control that all individual initiative is stifled with red tape.

But this does not mean that we should carry our prejudices against socialism into our dealings with socialist-minded Asians, for whom the term has entirely different connotations. What hope can we have for effective communication with them if we hold doggedly to the words and phrases that we like but that frighten them, while reacting in anger and fear against the terms they cherish? When we do this we are speaking in mutually unintelligible idioms, even if we both are using the same language. In communicating with Asians, we should attempt to use words and phrases according to the connotations and emotional overtones the terms have for them. If in dealing with socialist Asians, for example, we first made clear the excellent claims we have for being regarded in some ways as the leading socialist nation in the world, we might not only establish much more harmonious and satisfying contacts but also have much greater hope of convincing them of the very real dangers of what we mean by socialism.

The use of socialist idiom when necessary is but one example of the many ways in which we must translate our concepts into the native patterns of thought as well as into the native languages. But even supposing an adequate body of ideas and corresponding ability to translate them

as required by local attitudes, we still would face the problem of creating adequate agencies for the war of ideas.

While the government, for financial reasons, will undoubtedly have to bear the major burden in communication with Asians, this field above all others is one in which private educational and philanthropic agencies can and must play an important role. In other words, we must rely to a large extent on private enterprise. One reason is the very fact that in many parts of Asia we must couch our arguments in terms that will be understandable to socialist-minded people. In a totalitarian state the government can say one thing at home and the opposite abroad without any fear of undesirable domestic repercussions, but in a democracy even a variation of idiom raises difficulties.


An American can hardly speak intelligibly and effectively to the socialistically oriented Burmese, for example, without becoming correspondingly unintelligible to many of his compatriots at home. But the official representative of a government cannot limit his words artificially to one audience. One can imagine the explosion if a junketing congressman hears an American official in Burma talking of the great "socialist" achievements of the United States. The American people, he might quite reasonably feel, had not paid their taxes to support this sort of treachery. American representatives abroad obviously need not be hobbled so completely as they are today in the war of ideas, any more than they need be surrounded by the present state of fear and demoralization that has undermined their value as reporting officers—that is, as the eyes and ears of the United States abroad. On the other hand, it seems Utopian to hope that Congress and the general public will come to have so thorough an understanding of the ideological problems abroad that they will give our repre-

sentatives free rein in translating our concepts into the local idiom.

But where the government leaves off in its efforts, private enterprise can begin. Individual Americans or representatives of private foundations can speak with a freedom and therefore with a cogency that representatives of the government can rarely achieve. They can also speak with the diversity of points of view that is the true strength of democracy. There can be a single party line for Communists, but any narrowly defined policy for the representatives of a democracy in the war of ideas is in a sense a falsification of democracy itself and eliminates the rich variation that gives it its flexibility and resilience. The private citizen is needed not only to say what the official representative cannot say for fear of being misunderstood at home, but also to give to our statements the variety that is the only true measure of our views.

The private citizen also has the great advantage in the war of ideas of being in large part free of the natural suspicion with which any people insulates representatives of a foreign government. The private American, while not standing on the elevated stage of official status, finds himself by this very fact closer to the people with whom he wishes to communicate. He can more easily enter into the free and uninhibited give-and-take of ideas on which our whole concept of democratic progress depends.

The work to be undertaken by private groups and individuals in the ideological field is almost endless. We should be trying to establish fruitful intellectual contacts at every possible level. The limitations are purely those of available funds and suitable personnel. The possibilities may best be seen from a consideration of one of the most obvious and important areas of activity—the universities of Asia.



In Asia the individual university plays a more important part than in the United States. While an incomparably smaller percentage of the population attends college, the experience of higher education marks a much sharper dividing line between leadership and the masses than it does with us. The governments of Burma and Indonesia are made up of men who were themselves students in universities just a few short years ago, and throughout Asia it is safe to assume that, in comparison with American students, a much higher proportion of those now attending classes in universities in Asia will be important in the politics of their countries—and much sooner. The intellectual experience of the young men and women of Asia in their college years is a matter of the greatest importance for the future of Asia.

Under these circumstances it is to our interest that the universities of Asia should be as good as possible and that the instruction in them should represent the best in modern scholarship. But this is by no means the fact. In many Asian countries higher education is essentially a matter of prescribed courses leading to prescribed degrees ostensibly leading to specific careers, but having little to do with the great intellectual ferment of our day. Such key subjects as economics and history do not progress far enough into the modern age to have much relevancy for the present situation, and the study of sociology may be entirely lacking. Or the theories and established facts of the modern social sciences may be taught out of textbooks that represent the attainments of a half-century ago. As a consequence, it is not unusual to find an Asian student taking a degree at a university in some stereotyped field of study but receiving his education in the modern world at the nearby Communist bookstall. It is also not surprising to find Marxism considered by Asian students the latest thing in theory, for they are largely unaware of the subse-

quent information and thought that have relegated Marxism to the position of a stimulating and interesting theory of a century ago, but hardly an adequate system of thought for the mid-twentieth-century world.

We have not been totally unaware of this situation and have done some things to meet it, though with only indifferent success. There are many mission-supported colleges in Asia, which at one time were extremely important in the field of higher education but in more recent decades have often sunk to the status of second-rate institutions when compared with the local government universities. Through such admirable methods as the Fulbright program we have sought to send private teachers to Asia, though only on a trifling scale.

We have had many private or government programs to train Asian students in this country, though here again the scale has been small and the handling of the programs sometimes unwise. In a desire to see that all American states and colleges were proportionately represented in the program, the administering agencies have at times sent Asian specialists to colleges where they found no adequate guidance in their particular fields of study, and those who went to our bigger institutions sometimes found themselves in a coolly impersonal atmosphere, in which unhappy contacts with racially prejudiced landladies sometimes loomed larger than their occasional contacts with the scholars with whom they had hoped to work.

~~We should~~ be trying to give promising Asian scholars the best training that can be found in the Western world under the most favorable conditions for their particular needs and problems. Beyond this we should be attempting to place the best Western scholars and teachers we can find in Asian universities. Few first-rate scholars are willing to go to Asia under present conditions of extreme financial insecurity and temporary eclipse from the West-

ern scholarly world. But this difficulty could be easily surmounted by making a period of work in an Asian university financially and professionally attractive. If this were done, outstanding scholars could be induced to teach in Asia, where they would find their work immensely stimulating to themselves as well as invaluable to their students. They would find themselves engaged in a dynamic intellectual exchange of a type that can only strengthen free thought and weaken the appeal of dogmatism, whether in the name of Marx or some other modern ism. There would be no need to check on what Western scholars in Asia said or did. They might learn to speak in terms that could not be understood by most Americans or might say things with which some of us would not agree. But if they were true representatives of the best in modern Western scholarship, their influence without doubt would be profoundly beneficial not only for Asians but also for the West.

The field of university teaching is but one of many in which there are great possibilities and a pressing need for free enterprise in the war of ideas in Asia. But this is not to say that the role of the government in the ideological war is unimportant. The government representative can be very influential, for either good or evil, because his words and deeds are watched more closely and judged more severely. Whether we realize it or not, we have an ideological campaign under way wherever a representative of our government can be seen or heard by Asians.

It is perhaps time for us to reconsider the entire nature of our foreign relations and the whole functioning of our foreign service. Diplomatic relations have grown out of the exchange of personal representatives between kings, and they still preserve some of the aristocratic aura of their origin. But diplomatic relations today are not

really between individual rulers but between whole peoples of entire nations. Although the American ambassador in any country is in theory the President's personal messenger to the local head of state, he actually is the representative of the American people to the people of that land. The same is true of all the members of the ambassador's staff. Their specific functions are extremely varied, but all play a part in this most important of all public-relations problems in the modern world.

An ambassador stands in a unique position in the relations between two peoples. Ideally, therefore, he should be the embodiment of all that we feel to be best in our society. But usually he is selected for entirely different reasons. His appointment may be a reward for a substantial campaign contribution or a consolation prize for a defeated politician. Preferably, it may be because he is a good housekeeper in administering a complex branch of government or again because he is an astute political reporter or perhaps a skillful negotiator. These are necessary functions in an embassy, but they are specialized duties not differing in type from the specialized functions of military, naval, or commercial attachés. It is a pity to waste the key post of ambassador on a man with only such technical skills.

Actually we have had in recent years a good demonstration of what an ambassador can accomplish in representing the American people to a foreign country. Chester Bowles as Ambassador to India was undoubtedly a happy accident rather than a planned diplomatic triumph. He went to India not because of any perceptive Democratic strategy, but only because he was defeated at the polls, and the President was ready to give him the post he asked for. Not by training or planning but by simple intuition he hit upon the most effective way of representing the