

I. THE THREE METHODS OF WRITING HISTORY

The subject of these lectures is the philosophy of world history. This means that we are not concerned with general deductions drawn from history, illustrated by particular examples from it, but with the nature of history itself. What we mean by history will become clear if we begin by discussing the other methods of dealing with it. There are, in all, three methods of treating history:

1. Original History
2. Reflective History
3. Philosophical History.

1. We shall get an immediate and definite picture of the first kind by mentioning a few names. Take, for example, the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and similar historians. They primarily described the actions, events, and conditions which they had before their own eyes and whose spirit they shared. They transferred what was externally present into the realm of mental representation and thus translated the external appearances into inner conception—much as does the poet, who transforms perceptual material into mental images. These original historians, of course, drew also upon statements and reports of others—it is impossible that one man can see everything. But the poet, too, draws on the product of others; his most priceless possession is language. The historian binds together the fleeting rush of events and deposits it for immortality in the temple of Mnemosyne. Myths, folk songs, traditions are not part of original history; they are still obscure modes and peculiar to obscure peoples. Here we deal with peoples who knew who they were and what they wanted. Observed and observable reality is a more solid foundation for history than the transience of myths and epics. Once a people

has reached firm individuality, such forms cease to be its historical essence.

Original historians, then, transform the events, actions, and situations present to them into a work of representative thought. Hence, the content of such history cannot be of large external scope—consider, for example, Herodotus, Thucydides, Guicciardini;¹ their essential subject is what is actual and living in their environment. The culture of the author and that of the events created in his work, the spirit of the author and that of the actions he relates are one and the same. He describes what he has, more or less, experienced, or at least witnessed as a contemporary. He deals with short periods of time, individual presentations of men and events. Out of individual, unreflected features he composes his portrait in order to bring it before posterity as distinctly as he experienced it in person or in the personal accounts of others. He is not concerned with reflections about the events. He lives the spirit of the events; he does not yet transcend them. If, like Caesar, he belongs to the rank of the military or political leaders, then it is his very own aims which appear as history.

When we say here that such an historian does not reflect about events, but that persons and peoples appear themselves in his work, we seem to be contradicted by the orations which can be read, for example, in Thucydides. It is certainly true that they have never been made in this form. But speeches are actions among men and, indeed, most effective ones. True enough, people often say they were *merely* talks and thus supposedly insignificant. But *such* talk is merely chatter, and chatter has the important advantage of being historically insignificant. But speeches from peoples to peoples or to peoples and princes are integral parts of history. Even granted, therefore, that orations like those of Pericles—that most profoundly accomplished, most genuine, and most noble of statesmen—had been elaborated by Thucydides, they were yet not foreign to Pericles' character. In these orations these men expressed

¹ Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), in his *Istoria d'Italia* (published 1561-64), treats the period from 1492 to 1534.

the maxims of their people, of their own personality, the consciousness of their political situation, and the principles of their moral and spiritual nature, their aims and actions. What the historian puts into their mouths is not a borrowed consciousness but the speaker's own mind.

There are not as many historians as one may think whose close and continued study is necessary if we want to re-live the life of nations and enter into their spirit—historians who give us not only scholarship but deep and genuine enjoyment. We have already mentioned Herodotus, the father and founder of history, and Thucydides; Xenophon's *Anabasis* is an equally original work; Caesar's *Commentaries* are the simple masterpiece of a great mind. In antiquity these historians were necessarily great captains and rulers. In the Middle Ages, if we except the bishops who stood in the center of political events, the monks, as naïve writers of chronicles, were as much isolated from, as the men of antiquity were connected with, the course of events. In modern times all this has changed. Our minds are primarily conceptual and immediately transform all events into reports for communication. We have excellent works of this type—simple and concise ones—mainly about military events, which can well be compared with those of Caesar and even exceed them in wealth of information and description of techniques and circumstances. Here also belong the French "Memoirs." They are often written by witty men about small areas of events and with an abundance of anecdotes, so that their historical basis is rather thin; but some, as those of Cardinal von Retz,² are true historical masterpieces, which survey a larger historical field. Germany has few such masters: Frederick the Great with his *Histoire de Mon Temps* is a noteworthy exception. Such men must really be of high social position. Only when one stands on high ground can one survey the situation and note every detail, not when one has to peer up from below through a small hole.

2. The second method of history may be called the *reflec-*

² Jean François Paul de Condi, Cardinal von Retz (1614-79), Archbishop of Paris and leader of the Fronde.

tive. It is that kind of history which transcends the present—not in time but in spirit. Here we must distinguish several kinds:

(a) The first is universal history, that is, the survey of the entire history of a people, a country, or the world. Here the main thing is the elaboration of the historical material. The historian achieves this with his own spirit, which is different from the spirit of the material. What is important here is, on the one hand, the principle with which the author approaches the content and meaning of the actions and events he describes, and, on the other hand, his own method of writing history. With us Germans, reflection and understanding vary greatly in these respects; each historian insists on his own peculiar ways and manners. The English and French have a more general knowledge of how to write history. They are on a higher level of universal and national culture. With us everybody invents something peculiar for himself, and instead of writing history we keep on trying to find out how history ought to be written.

This first kind of reflective history connects with original history if it has no other purpose than to present the totality of a country's history. Such compilations—as those of Livy, of Diodorus of Sicily, and Müller's "History of Switzerland"³—are most commendable when well done. In this case it is best, of course, for the writer to approximate closely the first mode and write so plastically that the reader gets the impression that he is listening to contemporaries and eyewitnesses of the events. But the individuality of spirit which must characterize a writer who belongs to a certain cultural period is frequently not in accord with the spirit that runs through the period he writes about. The spirit that speaks out of the writer is quite different from that of the times he describes. Thus Livy makes his old Roman kings, consuls, and generals speak in the fashion of accomplished lawyers of the Livian era, which contrasts strikingly with the genuine traditions of Roman antiquity,

³ Johannes von Müller (1752-1809), *Schweizergeschichten*, 24 vols., written 1780-1808, published 1810.

such as the fable of Menenius Agrippa.⁴ Livy also gives us descriptions of battles as if he had seen them himself; but their features are simply features of battles of any period. And their distinctness contrasts further with the lack of connection and the inconsistency in his treatment of other, often essential, features. The difference between such a compiler and an original historian may best be seen when one compares the work of Livy with that of Polybius, and the manner in which Livy uses, expands, and abridges the historical periods which are preserved in Polybius' account. Johannes von Müller, in order to be true to the times he describes, has given his history a stilted, hollowly solemn, pedantic character. One does better to read these things in old Tschudi,⁵ where everything is more naïve and natural without such artificial, affected archaism.

A history of this kind, which endeavors to survey long periods or the whole of world history, must give up the individual presentation of reality and abridge itself by means of abstractions, not only in the sense of leaving out events and actions, but also in the sense of making thought itself the mightiest epitomist. A battle, a great victory, a siege are no longer themselves; they are concentrated in simple statements. When Livy speaks of the wars with the Volsci he says at times shortly enough: "This year war was carried on with the Volsci."

(b) A second kind of reflective history is the pragmatic. In dealing with the past and occupying ourselves with a remote world, there opens up for the mind an actuality which arises out of its own activity and as reward for its labor. The events are many, but their universal idea and their inner connection are one. This nullifies the past and makes the event present. Pragmatic reflections, no matter how abstract, belong indeed to the present, and the stories of the past are quickened into present-day life. Whether such reflections are really interesting

⁴ The moral of which is that it is unwise to starve oneself to spite one's stomach.

⁵ Aegidius von Tschudi (1505-72), *Schweizerchronik*, published 1734-36.

and full of life depends on the spirit of the writer. Here belong, in particular, moral reflections and the moral enlightenment to be derived from history, for the sake of which history has often been written. Although it must be said that examples of good deeds elevate the soul and should be used in the moral instruction of children in order to impress upon them moral virtue, the destiny of peoples and nations—their interests, conditions, and complicated affairs—are a different matter. One often advises rulers, statesmen, and peoples to learn from the experiences of history. But what experience and history teach is that peoples and governments have never yet learned from history, let alone acted according to its lessons. Every age has conditions of its own and is an individual situation; decisions must and can be made only within, and in accordance with, the age itself. In the turmoil of world affairs no universal principle, no memory of similar conditions in the past can help us—a vague memory has no power against the vitality and freedom of the present. Nothing is more shallow in this respect than the oft-repeated appeal to Greek and Roman examples during the French Revolution; nothing is more different than the nature of these peoples and that of our own times. Johannes von Müller had such moral intentions in his universal as well as in his Swiss history; for the enlightenment of princes, governments, and peoples, particularly the Swiss people, he prepared his own collection of lessons and reflections and often gives in his correspondence the exact number of reflections produced during the week. But he must not count these works among his best. Only the thorough, free, and comprehensive insight into situations and the deep understanding of their idea—as for example in Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*—can make such reflections true and interesting. One reflective history, therefore, supersedes another. Each writer has access to the materials; each can think himself able to arrange and elaborate them and inject his spirit into them as the spirit of the ages. Weary of such reflective histories, one has frequently taken recourse to presenting events from all possible angles. Such histories are, it is true, of some value,

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Considerations

but they offer mostly raw material. We Germans are content with them; the French, however, spiritedly create a present for themselves and refer the past to the present state of affairs.

(c) The third kind of reflective history is the critical. It must be mentioned, for this is the mode in which in present-day Germany history is written. It is not history itself which is presented here, but rather history of historiography: evaluation of historical narratives and examination of their truth and trustworthiness. The outstanding feature of this method, in point of fact and of intention, consists in the acuteness of the author who wrests results from narrations rather than from events.⁶ The French have here given us much that is profound and judicious. But they have not attempted to pass off such a purely critical procedure as historical; rather, they have presented their evaluations in the form of critical treatises. With us, the so-called "higher criticism" has taken possession not only of all philology but also of historical literature. This higher criticism has then served to justify the introduction of all kinds of unhistorical monstrosities of pure imagination. Here we have another method of gaining actuality from history: replacing historical data by subjective fancies—fancies which are held to be the more excellent, the bolder they are, that is, the smaller their factual basis and the larger their contradiction with the most definite facts of history.

(d) The last kind of reflective history is that which presents itself openly as fragmentary. It is abstractive but, in adopting universal points of view—for example the history of art, of law, of religion—it forms a transition to philosophical world history. In our time this kind of conceptual history has been particularly developed and emphasized. Such branches of history refer to the whole of a people's history; the question is only whether this total context is made evident or merely shown in external relations. In the latter case they appear as purely accidental peculiarities of a people. But if such reflec-

⁶ The text here is ambiguous. It may also be read as meaning that the outstanding feature of this method lies in the author and not in the events.

tive history succeeds in presenting general points of view and if these points of view are true, it must be conceded that such histories are more than the merely external thread and order of events and actions, that they are indeed their internal, guiding soul. For, like Mercury, the guide of souls, the Idea is in truth the guide of peoples and the world; and the Spirit, its rational and necessary will, guides and always has guided the course of world events. To learn to know it in its office of guidance is our purpose. This brings us to:

3. The third method of history, the *philosophical*. There was little in the two preceding methods that had to be clarified; their concept was self-explanatory. But it is different with this last one, which indeed seems to require some commentary or justification. The most universal definition would be that philosophy of history is nothing but the thoughtful contemplation of history. To think is one of those things we cannot help doing; in this we differ from the animals. In our sensation, cognition, and intellection, in our instincts and volitions, in as far as they are human, there is an element of thinking. But reference to thinking may here appear inadequate. In history, thinking is subordinate to the data of reality, which latter serve as guide and basis for historians. Philosophy, on the other hand, allegedly produces its own ideas out of speculation, without regard to given data. If philosophy approached history with such ideas, it may be held, it would treat history as its raw material and not leave it as it is, but shape it in accordance with these ideas, and hence construct it, so to speak, a priori. But since history is supposed to understand events and actions merely for what they are and have been, and is the truer, the more factual it is, it seems that the method of philosophy would be in contradiction to the function of history. This contradiction and the charge consequently brought against philosophy shall here be explained and refuted. But we shall not, for that matter, attempt to correct the innumerable specific misrepresentations which are current and continuously recur about the aims, interests, and methods of history, and its relations to philosophy.

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II. REASON AS THE BASIS OF HISTORY

The sole thought which philosophy brings to the treatment of history is the simple concept of Reason: that Reason is the law of the world and that, therefore, in world history, things have come about rationally. This conviction and insight is a presupposition of history as such; in philosophy itself it is not presupposed. Through its speculative reflection philosophy has demonstrated that Reason—and this term may be accepted here without closer examination of its relation to God—is both *substance and infinite power*, in itself the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life as well as the *infinite form*, the actualization of itself as content. It is *substance*, that is to say, that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. It is *infinite power*, for Reason is not so impotent as to bring about only the ideal, the ought, and to remain in an existence outside of reality—who knows where—as something peculiar in the heads of a few people. It is the infinite *content* of all essence and truth, for it does not require, as does finite activity, the condition of external materials, of given data from which to draw nourishment and objects of its activity; it supplies its own nourishment and is its own reference. And it is *infinite form*, for only in its image and by its fiat do phenomena arise and begin to live.¹ It is its own exclusive presupposition and absolutely final purpose, and itself works out this purpose from potentiality into actuality, from inward source to outward appearance, not only in the natural but also in the spiritual universe, in world history. That this *Idea* or *Reason* is the True, the Eternal, the Absolute Power and that it and nothing but it, its glory and majesty, manifests itself in the world—this, as we said before, has been proved in philosophy and is being presupposed here as proved.

Those among you, gentlemen, who are not yet acquainted

¹ This sentence, deleted in the second edition, is here restored from the first edition.

with philosophy could perhaps be asked to come to these lectures on world history with the belief in Reason, with a desire, a thirst for its insight. It is indeed this desire for rational insight, for cognition, and not merely for a collection of various facts, which ought to be presupposed as a subjective aspiration in the study of the sciences. For even though one were not approaching world history with the thought and knowledge of Reason, at least one ought to have the firm and invincible faith that there is Reason in history and to believe that the world of intelligence and of self-conscious willing is not abandoned to mere chance, but must manifest itself in the light of the rational Idea. Actually, however, I do not have to demand such belief in advance. What I have said here provisionally, and shall have to say later on, must, even in our branch of science, be taken as a summary view of the whole. It is not a presupposition of study; it is a *result* which happens to be known to myself because I already know the whole. Therefore, only the study of world history itself can show that it has proceeded rationally, that it represents the rationally necessary course of the World Spirit, the Spirit whose nature is indeed always one and the same, but whose one nature unfolds in the course of the world. This, as I said, must be the result of history. History itself must be taken as it is; we have to proceed historically, empirically. Among other things, we must not let ourselves be tempted by the professional historians, for these, particularly the Germans, who possess great authority, practice precisely what they accuse the philosophers of, namely, a priori historical fiction. For example, it is a widespread fabrication that there was an original, primeval people taught immediately by God, endowed with perfect insight and wisdom, possessing a thorough knowledge of all natural laws and spiritual truths; or that there were such or such sacerdotal peoples; or, to mention a more specific matter, that there was a Roman epos from which the Roman historians derived the earliest history—and so on. Apriorities²

² "Authorities" (*Autoritäten*) in earlier editions was a misreading. The original text is *Aprioritäten*.

of this kind we shall leave to these talented professional historians, among whom, at least in our country, their use is quite common. As our first condition we must therefore state that we apprehend the historical faithfully. In such general terms, however, as "faithfully" and "apprehend" lies an ambiguity. Even the average and mediocre historian, who perhaps believes and pretends that he is merely receptive, merely surrendering himself to the data, is not passive in his thinking. He brings his categories with him and sees the data through them. In everything that is supposed to be scientific, Reason must be awake and reflection applied. To him who looks at the world rationally the world looks rationally back. The relation is mutual. But we cannot treat here the various modes of reflection, of points of view, of judgment, not even those concerning the relative importance or unimportance of facts—the most elementary category.

Only two aspects of the general conviction that Reason has ruled in the world and in world history may be called to your attention. They will give us an immediate opportunity to examine our most difficult question and to point ahead to the main theme.

1. The first is the historical fact of the Greek, Anaxagoras, who was the first to point out that nous, understanding in general or Reason, rules the world—but not an intelligence in the sense of an individual consciousness, not a spirit as such. These two must be carefully distinguished. The motion of the solar system proceeds according to immutable laws; these laws are its reason. But neither the sun nor the planets, which according to these laws rotate around it, have any consciousness of it. Thus, the thought that there is Reason in nature, that nature is ruled by universal, unchangeable laws, does not surprise us; we are used to it and make very little of it. Also, this historical circumstance teaches us a lesson of history: things which may seem trivial to us have not always been in the world; a new thought like this one marks an epoch in the development of the human spirit. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras, as the originator of this thought, that he ap-

peared like a sober man among the drunken. From Anaxagoras, Socrates adopted the doctrine, which became forthwith the ruling idea in philosophy, except in the school of Epicurus, who ascribed all events to chance. "I was delighted about this," Plato makes Socrates say, "and hoped to have found a teacher who would interpret Nature by Reason and would show me in the particular its particular purpose, and in the universal, the universal purpose. I should not have given up this hope for anything. But how greatly was I disappointed when, having zealously applied myself to the writings of Anaxagoras, I found that he mentions only external causes, such as Air, Ether, Water, and the like, instead of Reason."³ It is evident that the insufficiency which Socrates found in the principle of Anaxagoras has nothing to do with the principle itself, but with Anaxagoras' failure to apply it to concrete nature. Nature was not understood or comprehended through this principle; the principle remained abstract—nature was not understood as a development of Reason, as an organization brought forth by it. I wish at the very outset to draw your attention to this difference between a concept, a principle, a truth, as confined to the abstract and as determining concrete application and development. This difference is fundamental; among other things we shall come back to precisely this point at the end of our world history, when we deal with the most recent political events.

(2) The second point is the historical connection of the thought that Reason rules the world with another form of it, well known to us—that of religious truth: that the world is not abandoned to chance and external accident but controlled by Providence. I said before that I do not make any demand on your belief in the principle announced; but I think I may appeal to this belief in its religious form, unless the nature of scientific philosophy precludes, as a general rule, the acceptance of any presuppositions; or, seen from another angle,

³ *Phaedo*, 97-98. Hegel paraphrases this passage. Cf. Plato's *Phaedo*, translated by F. J. Church, edited by F. H. Anderson (New York, Liberal Arts Press), pp. 50f.

unless the science itself which we want to develop should first give the proof, if not of the truth, at least of the correctness of our principle. The truth that a Providence, that is to say, a divine Providence, presides over the events of the world corresponds to our principle; for divine Providence is wisdom endowed with infinite power which realizes its own aim, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world. Reason is Thought determining itself in absolute freedom.

On the other hand, a difference, indeed an opposition, now appears between this faith and our principle, very much like that between Socrates' expectation and the principle of Anaxagoras. For this faith is also indefinite, it is what is called faith in Providence in general; it is not followed up in definite application to the whole, the comprehensive course of world history. To explain history means to reveal the passions of men, their genius, their active powers. This definiteness of Providence is usually called its *plan*. Yet this very plan is supposed to be hidden from our view; indeed, the wish to recognize it is deemed presumption. The ignorance of Anaxagoras about the manifestation of Reason in reality was naïve; the knowledge of the principle had not yet developed, either in him or in Greece in general. He was not yet able to apply his general principle to the concrete, to deduce the latter from the former. Only Socrates took the first step in comprehending the union of the concrete and the universal. Anaxagoras, then, was not opposed to such application; but the faith in Providence is. It is opposed at least to the application at large of our principle, to the *cognition* of the plan of Providence. In particular cases, it is true, one allows it here and there, when pious minds see in particular events not only chance but God's will—when, for example, an individual in great perplexity and need gets unexpected help. But these instances are limited to the particular purposes of this individual. In world history the "individuals" that we have to deal with are peoples; they are totalities which are states. We cannot, therefore, be satisfied with what we may call this "retail" view of faith in Providence, nor with the merely abstract, undeter-

mined faith in the universal statement that there is a Providence, without determining its definite acts. On the contrary, we must seriously try to recognize the ways of Providence, its means and manifestations in history, and their relation to our universal principle.

But in mentioning at all the recognition of the plan of divine Providence I have touched on a prominent question of the day, the question, namely, whether it is possible to recognize God—or, since it has ceased to be a question, the doctrine, which has now become a prejudice, that it is impossible to know God. Following this doctrine we now contradict what the Holy Scripture commands as our highest duty, namely, not only to love but also to know God. We now categorically deny what is written, namely, that it is the spirit which leads to truth, knows all things, and penetrates even the depths of divinity. Thus, in placing the Divine Being beyond our cognition and the pale of all human things, we gain the convenient license of indulging in our own fancies. We are freed from the necessity of referring our knowledge to the True and Divine. On the contrary, the vanity of knowledge and the subjectivity of sentiment now have ample justification. And pious humility, in keeping true recognition of God at arm's length, knows very well what it gains for its arbitrary and vain striving.

I wanted to discuss the connection of our thesis—that Reason governs and has governed the world—with the question of the possible knowledge of God, chiefly in order to mention the accusation that philosophy avoids, or must avoid, the discussion of religious truths because it has, so to speak, a bad conscience about them. On the contrary, the fact is that in recent times philosophy has had to take over the defense of religious truths against many a theological system. In the Christian religion God has revealed Himself, which means He has given man to understand what He is, and thus is no longer concealed and secret. With this possibility of knowing God the obligation to know Him is imposed upon us. God wishes no narrow souls and empty heads for his children; He

wishes our spirit, of itself indeed poor, rich in the knowledge of Him and holding this knowledge to be of supreme value. The development of the thinking spirit only began with this revelation of divine essence. It must now advance to the intellectual comprehension of that which originally was present only to the feeling and imagining spirit.

[Feeling is the lowest form in which any mental content can exist. God is the Eternal Being in and for itself; and what is universal in and for itself is subject of thought, not of feeling. It is true that everything spiritual, every content of consciousness, anything that is product and subject of thought—in particular religion and morality—must also, and originally does, exist in the mode of feeling. But feeling is not the fount from which this content flows to man, but only a primal mode in which it exists in him. It is indeed the worst mode, a mode which he has in common with the animal. What is substantial must also exist in feeling, but it does mainly exist in a higher, more dignified form. If one wants to relegate the moral, the true, the most spiritual mental content necessarily to feeling and emotion and keep it there on general principle, one would ascribe to it essentially the animalic form; but this is not at all capable of containing the spirit. In feeling, the mental content is the smallest possible; it is present in its lowest possible form. As long as it is still in feeling it is veiled and entirely indefinite. It is still entirely subjective, present exclusively in the subjective form. If one says: "I feel such and such and so and so," then one has secluded himself in himself. Everybody else has the same right to say: "I don't feel it that way." And hence one has retreated from the common soil of understanding. In wholly particular affairs feeling is entirely in its right. But to maintain that all men had this or that in their feeling is a contradiction in terms; it contradicts the concept of feeling, the point of view of the individual subjectivity of each which one has taken with this statement. As soon as mental content is placed into feeling, everybody is reduced to his subjective point of view. If someone called anyone else by this or that epithet, the other would be entitled to give it

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back; and both, from their respective points of view, would be entitled to offend each other. If someone says he has religion in his feeling and the other that he does not find any God in his feeling, then both are right. If in this manner the divine content—the revelation of God, the relationship of man to God, the being of God for man—is reduced to pure feeling, then it is reduced to pure subjectivity, to the arbitrary, to whim. In this way one actually gets rid of truth as it is in and for itself. The true is universal in and for itself, essential, substantial; as such it can be only in and for thought.] The time has finally come to understand also the rich product of creative Reason which is world history.

It was for a while the fashion to admire God's wisdom in animals, plants, and individual lives. If it is conceded that Providence manifests itself in such objects and materials, why not also in world history? Because its scope seems to be too large. But the divine wisdom, or Reason, is the same in the large as in the small. We must not deem God too weak to exercise his wisdom on a grand scale. Our intellectual striving aims at recognizing that what eternal wisdom intended it has actually accomplished, dynamically active in the world, both in the realm of nature and that of the spirit. In this respect our method is a theodicy, a justification of God, which Leibniz attempted metaphysically, in his way, by undetermined abstract categories. Thus the evil in the world was to be comprehended and the thinking mind reconciled with it. Nowhere, actually, exists a larger challenge to such reconciliation than in world history. This reconciliation can only be attained through the recognition of the positive elements in which that negative element disappears as something subordinate and vanquished. This is possible through the consciousness, on the one hand, of the true ultimate purpose of the world and, on the other hand, of the fact that this purpose has been actualized in the world and that the evil cannot ultimately prevail beside it. But for this end the mere belief in *nous* and providence is not sufficient. "Reason," which is said to govern the world, is as indefinite a term as "Providence." One always speaks of Rea-

son without being able to indicate its definition, its content, which alone would enable us to judge whether something is rational or irrational. What we need is an adequate definition of Reason. Without such definition we can get no further than mere words. With this let us proceed to the second point that we want to consider in this introduction.