Hubert P. van Tuyll, *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet*

*Union, 1941-1945* (1989)

***“Lend-Lease” creates a mutual impact on Soviet and Western Allied war efforts: Lend-Lease enables the Red Army to achieve the mobility it required (and would not have been able to achieve without the aid) to engage in constant, sustained, and devastatingly effective offensives from Kursk on; this, in turn, enabled the Western Allied armies to achieve the successes they achieved because the sustained Red Army offensive (again, in large measure, made possible by Lend-Lease aid) helped the Western Allied war effort in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France. So—rather than saying Lend-Lease helped the Red Army alone, as Western scholars tend to argue, van Tuyll makes it a mutual impact argument. So Lend-Lease has a rebound effect, enabling the Red Army to provide a sort of “aid” to the Western Allied war effort.***

Preface

[**xi]** Research on any Soviet-related matter brings home the way in which almost any matter can become controversial or politicized. ***Lend-Lease*** is no exception and became a ***diplomatic and intellectual pawn during the Cold War, part of the argument over which nation did the most to vanquish Hitlerite Germany. In the long run this argument has become political and meaningless. Neither Lend-Lease nor the other Allied contributions to the war effort should obscure the immense sacrifices made by the Soviet people during the war. Lend-Lease, however, should receive its proper share of credit for its role during the Great Patriotic War, rather than being either exaggerated or minimized***….

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Introduction

At three in the morning on ***June 22, 1941***, a mighty force of 162 German and assorted allied divisions rolled across the Soviet border…. In a mere six weeks German forces reached Smolensk, two-thirds the way to Moscow. To many observers it appeared Adolf Hitler was destined to add the Soviet Union to his collection of military trophies, with incalculable consequences.

***Less than four years later*** the Red Army battered its way into the Reich, having destroyed or disabled the bulk of the German ground forces. For Germany *Goetterdaemmerung* had occurred: victory, unity, and the image of invincibility had been replaced by abject surrender, division into zones of occupation, and, later, public humiliation at Nuremberg. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had reached a new height in terms of power and international prestige, although at the fearful cost of more than 15 million dead.

***How did this dramatic change in fortune come to be? How did the Soviet Union manage to recover in the midst of desperate struggle and prevail against a foe that had established a European empire on a scale not seen since Napoleon? The reasons for Soviet victory and German defeat are complex***. The war in the East is too great a historical event to be explained in terms of a single formulation. Time, space, size of forces, and the Brobdingnagian expenditure of resources and lives by both primary combatants make the Eastern Front unique. The same time and space elements were present in World War I, but Germany was unwilling and Russia was incapable of waging the intense type of war in the East that took place in World War II.

[**2**] ***Popular books about the war explain the outcome in the East, when it is extensively discussed at all, in terms of weather, numbers, and Hitler’s errors***. Undoubtedly the ***problems faced by the Germans***, whether inherent or ***of their own making, should not be ignored***. Operation Barbarossa was an ambivalent concoction of military, economic, and political goals. The Nazi tank force was too small and improperly equipped in relation to the vast spaces of the western Soviet Union, its transport was mostly horse-drawn, and its intelligence about the Soviet state’s army and industry was woefully inadequate. ***Loath to admit their failures, German wartime leaders*** emphasize the Reich’s lack of preparedness.

***Yet the focus on German disadvantages is inherently one-sided and minimizes the achievements of the Soviet Union. Soviet writers have bitterly complained that Western publications about the war are distorted and inaccurate and ignore the heavy concentration of German ground forces on the Eastern Front.[[1]](#footnote-1) Their version of the conflict reverses the popular Western bias by interpreting the entire war in terms of the efforts of the Soviet Union. Hence they have tended to belittle many aspects of the Allied war effort, especially the Lend-Lease program.***

***Soviet writers are correct, however, in denouncing interpretations of the Eastern Front that omit any serious reference to the immense Soviet offensives of 1943-45***. German disadvantages can help explain Soviet survival, but not victory. The failure of Germany’s great offensives in 1941 and 1942, as well as the disaster at Kursk, robbed the Nazis of any meaningful chance for victory but did not predestine the arrival of Marshal I. Konev in Berlin in 1945. The Soviet Union might have survived the initial onslaught and then sought victory through a defensive war of attrition, but such a strategy would have been pursued at the cost of many years of partial occupation and an unfavorable postwar position. Instead, the Soviet leadership elected to drive Hitler’s army from its soil at the earliest possible moment.

***The ultimate (if costly) success of the Red Army depended on*** much more than German errors and Russian climate. The organization of massive offensives required ***enormous economic and human mobilization, the development of an infrastructure capable of planning, executing, and sustaining offensive operations, and the technical and intellectual capacity to coordinate forces. Add to this the condition of the Red Army (many of its field formations shattered in the first months of the war***, valuable officers, NCOs and equipment lost, its skill and initiative still hampered by the arrest and execution of most of its high-ranking officers in the purges),[[2]](#footnote-2) ***and the magnitude of the task becomes apparent***.

***The United States and Britain wanted to help the Soviet Union, if for no other reasons than self-interest. The only practical way of doing so was by furnishing materiel***. ***An Allied invasion of German-occupied Europe had to wait, for a wide variety of military and political reasons (none of which were viewed very sympathetically by the hard-pressed Soviet government). Britain was militarily overextended, had strategic interests to be protected in the Mediterranean and beyond Europe, and had perhaps not forgotten Stalin’s alliance with Hitler during the first 21 months of the war***. The United States did not formally enter the war until almost half a year after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and American [**3**] forces were not fully prepared for large-scale operations until much later in the war. Stalin may have preferred a “Second Front,” that is, a major invasion of Western Europe, but the image of the supremely confident German army caused many misgivings about a premature landing in Europe. As an alternative, the Soviet government twice suggested in late 1941 that 25 to 30 divisions might be sent via Archangel or Iran, a project so far in excess of shipping capacity that Churchill dismissed it as a “delusion.” After Stalingrad the Soviet government lost interest in having Allied troops on its soil and rejected almost all Western overtures on the subject.

***Material aid was then the only immediate way to help the Soviet Union. This was especially true for the United States***, which technically remained neutral until Pearl Harbor….

[**5**] ***The American military’s fear that the Soviet Union might surrender was mirrored by Soviet suspicions of whether the Anglo-American alliance actually planned to furnish aid. Roosevelt and Churchill did their best to allay this concern, fearing (despite Stalin’s denials) a Soviet withdrawal from the war***….

[**6**] ***Studies of the Soviet aid program*** include official histories, memoirs, scholarly studies, and, as is inevitable with any topic concerned with Soviet-American relations, polemics. ***Little has been said or written about the military impact of Lend-Lease***….

The first study to focus on the effect of aid on the Soviet war effort was an unpublished dissertation prepared by John Gardner in 1946.[[3]](#footnote-3) Gardner had to work with very limited material, as little had been declassified and he had few eyewitness accounts and memoirs to rely on. The ***wartime publications***… contain some interesting material, but both authors [Joseph Davies and E.R. Stettinius] clearly intended to promote, respectively, Soviet-American relations and Lend-Lease. Far more valuable was General John Deane’s *The Strange Alliance*. Deane had served as commander of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, an organization that (among other things) controlled [**7**] local aspects of the flow of aid to the Soviet Union. Deane was a keen observer, and his memoir is useful to anyone studying ***Soviet-American relations*** in this period. ***On the effects of Lend-Lease, however, Dean, like most other authors, speculates***, either due to lack of knowledge or reticence concerning still-classified material (the Military Mission files were declassified some three decades after the war)….

[**8**] ***Th[e] tendency to go to one extreme or the other permeates much non-Soviet literature on Lend-Lease. Roger Munting***’s “Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort” (1984) ***echoes the prevailing Soviet view that Lend-Lease was not very important. The program is condemned, however, as having overtly benefitted the Soviet Union in Antony C. Sutton’s* National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union** [1973].Sutton had previously written two outstanding volumes on the flow of technology into the Soviet Union, both of which provide invaluable background material for the study of Lend-Lease and the entire Soviet economy.

***The Soviet view of Lend-Lease… has generally minimized the importance of lend lease, it has logically published little about it***. One of the few sources devoted exclusively to the subject, N. Dunaeva’s “Lend-Lease: Facts and Falsehoods,” is primarily a response to certain selected Western authors who have claimed a substantial role for Lend-Lease in the Soviet victory. There are innumerable Soviet monographs and articles on the war which could be considered relevant, but few directly address Lend-Lease. The official Soviet history of World War II, published in 1977, contains valuable economic and military data which can be used to evaluate the importance of Lend-Lease…. ***Like their Western counterparts, Soviet authors have concentrated on the diplomatic and political aspects of the aid program***.

***American authors have neglected the military impact issue because their searches through documentary records of the Lend-Lease bureaucracy yielded little information***. This was in part due to some material remaining classified, but also ***because of the way in which the program was handled…. While one might assume that all these bureaucracies collectively gathered information about the use and impact of Lend-Lease supplies sent to the Soviet Union, this did not happen because it could not. As explained earlier, the Soviet Union alone among Lend-Lease recipients did not have to file specific proof that its*** [9] ***requests were justified by military necessity…. [because President] Roosevelt did not want Lend-Lease used as a bargaining tool to gain information from the Soviet Union [and, so, information was not collected]***…. ***Roosevelt… felt that it was more important to keep the Soviet Union as an effective ally than to gain intelligence information. Attaching a price tag to Lend-Lease might have caused unnecessary resentment in Moscow. The Soviet Union suffered horribly during the German invasion, and there was an underlying fear in some Western circles that Stalin might reach an accommodation with Hitler and withdraw from the war if continually provoked by his American ally. Fear of offending the Russians*** led to Hopkins’ rejection of the placing of U.S. agents in Siberia and the later dissolution of the Persian Gulf Command’s G-2 (Intelligence) unit….

[***11***] ***Not that it mattered. The Soviet Union was less than anxious to furnish specific information on its war effort or even the precise use of Lend-Lease materials***. The Russians were even less enthusiastic about having large numbers of Americans travelling around the Soviet Union…. ***[Yet,] Whether more would have been known if more Americans and British had been able to enter Russia is doubtful. The experience of those already stationed there suggests that it would have made little difference. The battlefront was almost completely invisible to Western eyes, and the rarely granted and often-delayed visits were usually uninformative***….

[**13**] Whatever the reasons for the restrictions on American information gathering, be they American policy or Soviet secrecy, their result was quite simple: U.S. knowledge about Lend-Lease equipment use was minimal….

[**15**] Given that few out of the plethora of sources are both credible and accurate, it is not easy to answer ***the major questions concerning Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. What did Lend-Lease mean to the Soviet war effort? The diplomatic history of the program has been analyzed in minute detail from conception to sudden termination, but the military impact of the program has received very little attention. Did Lend-Lease help the Soviet Union survive? Did it contribute to the great Soviet offensives of 1943-45? Were Lend-Lease supplies helpful at the front, or mainly an aid to the rear (Tyl’) functions, logistics, and command, control, and communications? Or were the industrial, raw material, and agricultural items more significant? Since aid flow was not uniform during the war, did these fluctuations affect the conflict?***

Nor are these the only questions. ***How did Lend-Lease affect Red Army operations and tactics? What did individual items mean to the Soviet Union? How did American and British shipments affect their own armed forces?*** What was the program’s effect on worldwide shipping allocation? Finally, did Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union have any significant impact, moral or physical? None of these questions lend themselves to, or deserve, a simplistic answer….

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Conclusion

[**138**] ***By a mixture of skill, determination, courage, and foreign assistance, the Soviet Union survived*** [in spite of the massive scale of the suffering and destruction the German invasion and occupation caused the people and the country]. ***Industries moved to safer locales, private gardens sprouted, the oblast system was reorganized to simplify administration, and incentives were introduced in factories***. “All for the front,” (*vce dlia fronta*) was far more than simply a propagandistic device; it expressed ***the willingness of the state and its subjects to do whatever was necessary to expel the enemy. “None can gainsay the gigantic effort by Soviet society nor gloss over the grievous hurts inflicted upon it, that numbing catalogue of bestiality, devastation, hardship and illimitable private griefs.”***[[4]](#footnote-4) In the words of Winston Churchill, ***the Soviet Union***, of which he was hardly an uncritical admirer, was an ally “which ***had broken the Germany [sic] Army as no other nation would have done.***”[[5]](#footnote-5)

To recapitulate, ***given that the Soviet Union accomplished much and suffered greatly, to what extent did Lend-Lease contribute to victory or perhaps alleviate the suffering? Most judgments on this subject are at best generalizations and at worst misstatements borne of ideology or ignorance***. As established earlier, American intelligence did not know what was done with Lend-Lease supplies and did not particularly care; its efforts were understandably focused on the enemy. War Plans Division officers tried to assess the use of various weapons, but as these officers did not influence American policy toward the U.S.S.R., they had no way of obtaining information. The Soviet Union was rarely pressed for information and almost never volunteered it.

Stalin did suggest at Yalta that the absence of Lend-Lease might have “deferred” the victory, but he did not speculate for how long, or precisely why. More ***recent Soviet spokesmen agree that Lend-Lease “positively influenced” the Soviet Union in its struggle and express gratitude for “moral and material” support during the war, but they generally argue that it did not “play a substantial role.”*** According to Mikhail Gorbachev, the “Soviet people remember the material help [**139**] which the Allies gave this country. Though it was not as great as the West is wont to claim, we are nevertheless grateful for that help and regard it as a symbol of cooperation.”[[6]](#footnote-6) ***Western efforts to interpret Soviet generalizations have not always succeeded.*** The author of one of the best histories of the diplomacy surrounding Lend-Lease buttresses his conclusion regarding the importance of American aid by stating that “by Stalin’s own admission, about two thirds of all major industrial enterprises had been rebuilt with equipment or technical assistance from the United States.”[[7]](#footnote-7) The “two thirds,” however, includes 1920s and 1930s imports from the United States.[[8]](#footnote-8)

***Wartime American views, as has been suggested earlier, were a combination of ignorance, certainty that the aid was important***, and a feeling that Lend-Lease was sufficiently important to justify the drain on the United States. ***As*** late as 1944 ***General Marshall***, despite his earlier reservations about diverting U.S. Army supplies, concluded that ***“Lend-Lease food and transport played a vital role in Red Army successes, as did combat aircraft. If Russia suddenly lost Lend-Lease, the Nazis could probably still defeat her.”*** Ambassador Standley and General Walsh independently concluded that Lend-Lease was essential for the survival of the Red Army, ***but Harry Hopkins,*** speaking at a conference in Moscow shortly after the surrender, diplomatically suggested that “***we had never believed that our Lend-Lease help had been the chief factor in the Soviet defeat of Hitler on the eastern front. This had been done by the heroism and blood of the Russian Army.”*** His position was echoed by the Foreign Economic Administration. Contrasting ***these wartime opinions*** is academically interesting but substantively useless, as ***none was supported by meaningful data***.

***Germany was sufficiently concerned about the effect of aid to the Soviet Union on its own chances for success to attempt to disrupt the convoys bound for Murmansk and Archangel. These operations, successful in 1942 and 1943, absorbed much of the German navy’s surface strength***. Superficially this indicates that ***Germany was very much worried about Lend-Lease***. Just before the ill-fated Christmas Day, 1943, anticonvoy raid, Admiral ***Doenitz*** informed the squadron that ***“The very considerable amount of war material that a convoy of some twenty ships could carry would add materially to Russia’s offensive strength” and referred to these shipments as “attempting to frustrate the heroic struggle of our Eastern Armies.”*** These operations did not take place, however, solely due to concern about Lend-Lease.[[9]](#footnote-9) The navy wanted to mute criticism that it was not contributing to the war effort. In addition, by 1942 there were few areas where German vessels could operate. In fact, in 1941 Doenitz (when still in charge of German submarines) protested the diversion of naval units to Norway, which he regarded as a “subsidiary” theatre.

***Did the Soviet Union survive because of Lend-Lease? No. Clearly the greatest crisis occurred in 1941-42, before Lend-Lease aid arrived in quantity. The military and economic situation of the country remained precarious, however, until the very end. Despite an economic recovery [especially in arms-related industries] that must be judged impressive given the circumstances, the Soviet Union could barely feed its people, its transport system remained only marginally adequate to move troops, industrial*** [140] ***goods, and staples, and its labor resources were very limited. In such an environment, every item of aid became important, perhaps more so than it would have been in the equipment-rich environment of U.S. and British forces.***

***Can that importance be measured or appraised meaningfully? Lend-Lease changed the way the war was fought, because American (and British) aid significantly increased Soviet offensive capacity. Transport and communications gear enabled the Red Army to concentrate rapidly and coordinate more effectively, which in turn increased the chance of launching successful surprise attacks [and close the trapped German troops into a pocket]. Lend-Lease [also] helped ease the manpower situation, thereby making more men available for recruitment into the army***.

***Perhaps the Soviet Union would have fought offensively even without Lend-Lease***. There is little evidence that Stalin ever planned for completely defensive warfare. ***The Red Army could not, however, have attacked as well or as often as it did without Lend-Lease. In 1943-45 the Soviet forces were almost continuously on the offensive***, not blindly moving forward along a single predetermined axis, but ***using enhanced mobility and communications to orchestrate a series of attacks. The Germans were confused and disoriented by the Red Army’s ability to reconcentrate rapidly and to mass troops and equipment at crucial points, none of which would have been possible without foreign transport and communications equipment***.

As the frequency and momentum of the Soviet offensives in 1943-45 deprived the Wehrmacht of time, flexibility, and breathing space, the Nazis were delayed in deploying such promising weapons as the V-2 rocket, the four models of jet aircraft under development by war’s end, and the Type XX and Type XXI submarines. By 1944 German resources were spread so thinly that shifting of large forces to win a decisive victory in any one theatre of war was probably impossible. While this was largely due to the size and power of the Red Army, there was more to it than that.[[10]](#footnote-10) ***If the Red Army had been unable to mount vigorous, frequent, overwhelming offensives throughout 1943-45, Germany could have significantly reduced its forces on the Eastern Front. Allied margins of victory in Sicily, Italy proper, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the air battles over Europe were often small. Any major shift of military resources by Germany would have had devastating results for the United Nations forces. It is for this reason that the argument occasionally made the Allied aid somehow contributed to the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe fails. Lend-Lease did help Soviet forces advance; without this advance, however, the Germans might have been able to foil the Anglo-American liberation of Western Europe***.

***In the absence of Lend-Lease, the Anglo-American forces in other theatres of war would have been larger, and their timetable might have been advanced. Lend-Lease unquestionably hampered the Allied effort in North Africa and to a lesser extent in the Pacific, and it ironically delayed the opening of the “Second Front” so often demanded by the Soviet government***.[[11]](#footnote-11) ***The single greatest problem was the shortage of shipping space.*** Shipping requirements ***for invasion preparations*** were immense. A single American division, for example, needed more than 120,000 tons to carry it and its supplies. ***The ‘run’ to Soviet ports [***141] ***was a direct drain on shipping***, as losses on the Murmansk route reached 20 percent. ***These problems reached a head in 1942, when*** the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa ***(Torch) could only take place by diverting shipping from Lend-Lease and from preparations for the invasion of France***. Even Churchill, a vigorous proponent of Torch, considered a postponement to avoid reducing shipments to the Soviet Union. ***Plans for a larger-scale invasion of North Africa (Super Gymnast) were abandoned because the Murmansk convoys would have had to be eliminated. The British and American governments opposed, and the Soviet government discouraged, proposals to shift shipping space from Lend-Lease to preparations for the “Second Front” [at Normandy]***.

Support for aid to the U.S.S.R. was not unanimous. The cost, especially early in the war, was high…. Expressions of frustration and irritation with the Soviet Lend-Lease program were frequent. In 1941-42 American officials feared that Lend-Lease supplies would fall into German hands if (as was expected) the U.S.S.R. lost the war. Nor did the American military willingly part with valuable materiel which appeared to be useful mostly for postwar reconstruction.

If all this were not enough, another complaint arose, primarily ***after the war. Roosevelt’s critics charged that somehow the United States had handed over Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. As a minor corollary to this “Yalta betrayal” theory***, some of these critics charged that Lend-Lease had helped the Soviet Union in this. If Lend-Lease increased the offensive capacity of the Red Army, the argument goes, ***the Soviet forces finished the war somewhat further west than might otherwise have been the case***.

As suggested earlier, ***this formulation ignores the question of whether Soviet weakness might have helped Nazi Germany to oppose the Anglo-American forces more effectively. But even if the critics are right in their contention, should, or could, the U.S. government have withheld Lend-Lease to prevent Soviet influence over Eastern Europe [REQUIRING A GREATER LAND-CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFEAT OF THE WEHRMACHT BY WESTERN ALLIED FORCES!!!]?*** Whether this would have had any effect late in the war beyond increasing Soviet hostility and suspicions is doubtful. Certainly by the time of the Yalta conference (February 4-11, 1945) the power of the Soviet forces was such that their advance through Eastern Europe could not have been stopped. ***More importantly, Lend-Lease hardly made up for the costs and suffering which the Soviet Union incurred during the war. No American city ever looked like Stalingrad, which, aside from one undamaged suburb, contained one habitable building at the end of the fighting there***. In addition, the Soviet Union did provide some “reverse Lend-Lease” aid, although this was necessarily quite small (table 46 [p. 182]). Dollar figures on this topic meant little, as the Russians rarely furnished such data. Recent Soviet valuations of wartime aid to America run into the billions, an estimate that cannot be taken seriously….

[**142**] In any event, criticisms of ***the Lend-Lease program*** for its positive effect on Soviet military operations ignore ***the reasons*** for which the program was ***established***. Ambassador Harriman, for example, was “not at all anxious about [the Red Army] going too far. The farther they go, the more I like it.” The United States should “give and give and give, with no expectation of any return, with no thought of a quid pro quo.”[[12]](#footnote-12) Roosevelt demanded in 1942 that “all material promised to the Soviets” be shipped, “regardless of the effect… on any part of our war program.”[[13]](#footnote-13) Lend-Lease was designed ***“to strengthen our first line of defense while we could build up our woefully weak military forces.” America’s aid was a tool to save Russia from defeat and “enable her to inflict telling blows on the enemy,” and, just in case, to forestall the possibility that Hitler and Stalin might settle their differences, thereby making Britain’s position untenable***..

***In the context of these broad goals, was Soviet Lend-Lease a successful program for the United States? Yes***. Critics who question Lend-Lease due to its drain on American forces and the advantages which accrued to the Soviet Union ignore both the basic American wartime strategy and the *zeitgeist*, ***the urgency and near panic regarding apparent Nazi invincibility from the spring of 1940 to El Alamein and Stalingrad [over two years later in late 1942]. The United States used its powerful economy and relative invulnerability [to foreign attack] to aid its allies, an economic strategy that absorbed about 15 percent of American wartime expenditures***.

***As much as American military leaders wanted to close with the enemy in battle, most recognized the wisdom of the Lend-Lease approach***….

[**143**] ***Is there a clear connection between the increasing aid flow in 1943-45 and Red Army victories? Yes***. It is true that Soviet sources argue that most shortages had disappeared, Soviet production had grown enough to support major military operations, and Lend-Lease was too small to have had much effect. The fact remains that many shortages were not eliminated, production had not completely recovered, and Lend-Lease aid fulfilled precisely the greatest needs. Lend-Lease supplies represented an important and possibly critical margin in many areas of the economy and also helped augment production.

Western technology proved a more subtle qualitative boost to the Soviet Union toward war’s end….

Imprecise as they may be, the numbers nevertheless do indicate what the Soviet Union thought it needed to win the war. The intensity and frequency of Soviet requests for supplies and the angry rejection of all proposals to reduce aid bely [sic] the suggestion that Lend-Lease aid was frivolous, irrelevant, or [a] minor part of the Soviet arsenal. The Soviet forces benefitted from imported combat equipment, communications gear, and transportation machinery. Army and people alike were helped by Lend-Lease food supplies, raw materials, industrial machinery, and finished goods of all types. In one way or another, all these forms of aid helped the Soviet Union relieve the perilously tight manpower situation. ***The Soviet Union most likely would have survived without Lend-Lease, and eventually the United Nations would have prevailed. [sic] but the war would have been longer, the alliance less firm, and the victory possibly less complete***..

1. FN 1, p. 15: “Anywhere from two-thirds to three-quarters of the German divisions were present on the Eastern Front. U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), ‘History of the War in Eastern Europe, 1941-1945” (Synopsis) (1953), U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. van Tuyll is right to include the effect of the purge on the Red Army, but should make a clear distinction between this as a Soviet crime against its own people in contrast to something imposed upon the Soviet Union and Soviet people by the foreign invader. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. FN 22, p. 17: “John Frederick Gardner, ‘The Lend-Lease Program of world War II: Analysis and Appraisal’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1946).” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. FN 9, p. 145: “Erickson, Road to Berlin,… 254.” [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. FN 10, p. 145: “Ibid., IX.” [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. FN 14, p. 145: “Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *A Time for Peace* (New York: Richardson & Steinman, 1985), 104-5.” [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. FN 15, p. 145: “George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 116.” [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. FN 16, p. 145: “Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. I DON’T UNDERSTAND THIS SENTENCE. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. ***SUCH A WELL THOUGHT-OUT AND COMPELLING TWO-WAY CLAIM!!! EAST AFFECTED WEST, WHICH AFFECTED EAST—THE MUTUAL INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF BOTH WESTERN ALLIED AND SOVIET WAR EFFORTS!!! NOT JUST AFFECT OF WESTERN EFFORT ON SOVIET WAR, BUT HOW IT HELPED CREATE A SOVIET EFFECT ON WESTERN WAR!!! WEST HELPS SOVIETS; SOVIETS HELP WEST AND THE SOVIET HELP IN TURN CREATED BY WESTERN AID TO IT!!!*** [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. ***So, in addition, even though Lend-Lease adversely affected Western military contribution by diverting resources to Soviet Union, but the overall impact of Lend-Lease was larger by increasing mobility and power of the Red Army than would have been on Western military impact on Germany. In effect, US/GB paid the Soviets to fight the war for us.*** [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. FN 35, p. 148: “Larry I Bland, ‘Averell Harriman, the Russians, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 1943-1945,’ *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 23 (1977), 406.” [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. FN 36, p. 148: “’History of the U.S. Military Mission [to Moscow],’ [Modern Military Records Division, R.G. 165, Box 146, OPD 336TS, N.A.], 352-353.” [↑](#footnote-ref-13)