



4-35 Ruins of the old Imperial Castle and army headquarters compound at center, half a mile from ground zero, looking southwest.

4-36 Imperial Castle and army headquarters compound. This photo is undated.




4-37 Looking west past the castle compound.





4-38 Captain Mitsuo Fuchida, air operations officer of the Japanese navy. As a commander, he had led the air attack on Pearl Harbor.



4-39 Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.



4-40 Dr. Yoshio Nishina, Japanese authority on atomic energy.

might be an atomic explosion shocked Okumiya. He knew that both the army and navy had been working on the possibility, but as far as he knew the project had not gone beyond "scientific investigation." Could the Americans have succeeded?

Okumiya's longtime friend, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (4-38), the navy's air operations officer, received word of the virtual destruction of Hiroshima from Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Shikazo Yano. For a few minutes he was utterly stunned, because he himself had been in Hiroshima attending an army conference until late the previous afternoon. From Yano's description, however, he had no doubt what had happened. "This must be the atomic bomb," he told Yano. And he urged the admiral to pressure the naval general staff to act at once to secure peace.

Far up the chain of command, Emperor Hirohito was of the same opinion. Immediately after the attack, His Majesty received the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Koichi Kido (4-39). Kido found that "the reports of the indescribably tragic conditions" had left the Emperor "overwhelmed with grief." And he commanded, "Under the circumstances, we must bow to the inevitable. No matter what happens to my safety, we must put an end to this war as speedily as possible so that this tragedy will not be repeated."

Not everyone was as realistic or as concerned with the Japanese people's welfare as Hirohito was. There was a strong disinclination to believe that what had happened was truly an atomic explosion, even after Truman's official announcement:


Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima. . . . It is an atomic bomb We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every

productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. . . . If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the like of which has never been seen on this earth.

Perhaps inevitably, the initial Japanese reaction was to form a committee. The "Atomic Bomb Countermeasure Committee" was established in the cabinet with Sumihisa Ikeda, chief of the cabinet planning bureau, as chairman. Members came from the War, Navy, and Home ministries and included Technical Board representatives. At the first meeting, held on August 7, these latter members "strongly insisted that the bomb was not an atomic bomb." They claimed that "no matter how advanced American technique may be" it was impossible for the Americans to have brought "such unstable weapons as atomic devices to Japan, across the Pacific." They added, "We do not know what will happen in the future, but to date American technique is not that highly developed."



In some asperity, Ikeda reminded them of Truman's statement. "I can hardly imagine that the Americans would broadcast such a lie. If it is not an atomic bomb, what is it?" And the technicians declared, "It must be a new type [of] bomb with special equipment, but its content is unknown." As a result, the word "atomic" did not appear in the initial public announcement.


Meanwhile, both the army and navy had sent teams to investigate the site. The army's group included Dr. Yoshio Nishina (4-40), Japan's "highest authority on atomic energy." He noted that "the general opinion in the military circles" was that Truman's announcement was probably "propaganda to scare the Japanese." So at the time Nishina withheld judgment, but his first aerial view of Hiroshima convinced him that "it definitely was the work of an atomic bomb" (4-41, 4-42, and 4-43).



4-41 Hiroshima from high altitude, August 7, 1945, exhibits few details, except for its roadnet.

4-42, 4-43 Two photographs offered as a comparison in the Strategic Bombing Survey study of Hiroshima, one before and one after the bomb explosion, showing the City Commercial Display Building.





4-44 Five overlapping photographs provide a stark, wide-angle view of Hiroshima from the vicinity of ground zero (indicated by the arrow). The City Commercial Display Building is at center. At right is the T-Bridge, near the divergence of the Matoyan and Ota rivers.


Fuchida and Okumiya were among those who hurried to the scene. Both men had spent years in the thick of aerial combat and were no strangers to horror, but what they saw was beyond all experience and all ability of words to convey. "It was like an evil nightmare," re-

called Fuchida. Indeed, the contrast between these grotesque ruins and the pleasant city where only two days ago he had been conferring with fellow officers must have been overwhelming.

The familiar T-Bridge's barriers had been knocked

4-45 Ground zero at Hiroshima (indicated by the arrow), looking south.





outward; utility poles stood at various angles, blown out by the blast (which had pushed aside countless tons of air), then pulled back by the suction created as air was forced back into the partial vacuum. Rainwater had collected in a pool on the roof of a building at the foot of the bridge, pushed down by the force of the blast (4-44).

Looking across the city, Fuchida, Okumiya, and the other investigators could see that many familiar landmarks no longer existed, or were changed almost beyond recognition (4-45, 4-46, and 4-47). It was all too easy to see the devastation, which near ground zero was almost total (4-48, 4-49, and 4-50), because the inspectors had

4-46 View of the island straddled by the Tenma and Fukushima rivers. The tip of the island is at lower right.





4-47 Looking south toward the ground zero area from a point $\frac{3}{4}$ mile farther north.


to proceed on foot. Transportation had come to an abrupt halt, streets were congested with refugees, and, while many bridges had survived, others did not (4-51).

Within half a mile of ground zero, even the strongest


modern structures had suffered significant damage (4-52). At about 800 feet south of the hypocenter, the blast had crushed a corner of the Hiroshima Gas Company's building (4-53 and 4-54). Of the Koa Fire Insur-

4-48 View looking west across the breadth of the city, half a mile from ground zero.





4-49, 4-50 View of the ruined city from atop the Red Cross building, half a mile from ground zero.



4-51 Although many of Hiroshima's bridges survived the explosion, some lighter ones did not.



4-52 Modern structures within half a mile of ground zero suffered severe damage, most often in the form of walls buckled away from the direction of the explosion.