

More Hashing

CAC 210
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Cryptography

- A cryptographic hash function is a special class of hash function
 - Mathematical algorithm that maps data of arbitrary size to a bit string of a fixed size (hash)
 - One-way function
- The input is the message
- The output (hash) is the message digest

Cryptographic Hash Functions


- Five main properties:
 1. Deterministic - same message always results in the same hash
 2. Quick to compute
 3. Infeasible to generate a message from the hash value except by brute force
 4. Small change to the message should result in a large change in the hash value
 5. Infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash

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Collision

Cryptographic Hash Functions



Cryptographic Hash Functions

- Designed to take a string of any length as input and produce a fixed-length hash value
- Must be able to withstand any cryptanalytic attack
 - Preimage resistance
 - Second preimage resistance
 - Collision resistance

Preimage Resistance

Trying to find a message that has a specific hash

- Given a hash value h , it should be difficult to find any message m such that $h = \text{hash}(m)$
- This concept is related to that of a one-way function

Second-Preimage Resistance

- Given an input m , it should be difficult to find a different input m' such that $\text{hash}(m) = \text{hash}(m')$.
- Similar to collision resistance
- Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance, but does not guarantee preimage resistance
- A second-preimage attack implies a collision attack and a preimage attack

Collision Resistance

- It should be difficult to find two different messages m and m' such that $\text{hash}(m) = \text{hash}(m')$
- Such a pair is called a cryptographic hash collision
- Requires a hash value at least twice as long as that required for preimage resistance
- A birthday attack is a way to find collisions:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack

Applications

- Verifying the integrity of files or messages
- Password verification
- Proof-of-work
- File or data identifier
- Pseudorandom generation and key derivation

2013 Password Hashing Competition

2015 > Argon2

June 2017, NIST issued revised guidelines:

“Verifies SHALL store memorized secrets in a form that is resistant to offline attacks. Memorized secrets SHALL be salted and hashed using a suitable one-way key derivation function.”



Collisions



- Collisions occur when two different objects result in the same hash
- In thinking about a hash table (dictionary), how could you put two items into the same slot?
- Two solutions:
 - Separate Chaining: use a linked list in each slot adding each collided object to the list
 - Linear Probing: if the slot we need (k) is filled, check $k + 1$, if it's filled, check $k + 2$ and so on

Separate Chaining

- What kind of problems are there with this approach?
 - The beauty of hash tables is the constant runtime
 - If we start using lists, then we are back to linear runtime
 - We can keep this constant though, if we were to use something called a load factor
 - The goal would be to keep the average length of the lists under this load factor

Linear Probing

- What kind of problems exist here?
 - Will you necessarily find an empty slot?
 - What happens when you reach the end of the hash table?
 - How do you find the element again?

Are collisions that big
of a deal?

Collision Attack

- A collision attack on a cryptographic hash tries to find two inputs producing the same hash value
- Find two different messages m and m' such that $\text{hash}(m) = \text{hash}(m')$
- Attacker has no control over the content of either message
- Every cryptographic hash function is inherently vulnerable to collisions using a birthday attack: a hash of n bits can be broken in $2^{n/2}$ time
- When a collision attack is discovered that is found to be faster than a birthday attack, a hash function is often denounced as “broken”


Collision Attack

- So, what does this mean?
- Do you know what a security certificate is?
- SSL (https) implies that there is a signed (validated) certificate approved by a valid certificate authority indicating that your content is secure
- An attacker can generate two certs with matching hashes, a legitimate one to send to the certificate authority and an invalid/malicious one
- The legitimate one would get signed, and that signature could then be transferred to the invalid one
- My computer would think the content is secure when it wasn't
- <https://www.cnet.com/news/web-browser-flaw-could-put-e-commerce-security-at-risk/>

Classic Cryptographic Hash Functions

MD4

- Created by Ronald Rivest (MIT) in 1990
- Digest length is 128 bits
- Collision attack published in 1995
- As of 2007, an attack can generate collisions in less than 2 MD4 hash operations




One MD4 operation : MD4 consists of 48 of these operations, grouped in three rounds of 16 operations. F is a nonlinear function; one function is used in each round. M_i denotes a 32-bit block of the message input, and K_i denotes a 32-bit constant, different for each operation.

MD5

- Designed by Ronald Rivest in 1991 to replace MD4
- Produces 128-bit hash value
- Extensive vulnerabilities
- Can be cracked by brute-force attack
- A collision attack exists that can find collisions within seconds on a computer with a 2.6GHz Pentium processor
- Despite this, as of 2015, it is still widely used

SHA-1

- Based on principles Rivest used
- Published in 1993 by NIST
- NSA withdrew the original (SHA-0) and replaced it with SHA-1 in 1995



One iteration within the SHA-1 compression function:

A, B, C, D and E are 32-bit words of the state;
F is a nonlinear function that varies;
left shift_n denotes a left bit rotation by n places;
n varies for each operation;
W_t is the expanded message word of round t;
K_t is the round constant of round t;
Addition denotes addition modulo 2³².

Examples

```
SHA1("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog")  
gives hexadecimal: 2fd4e1c67a2d28fced849ee1bb76e7391b93eb12  
gives Base64 binary to ASCII text encoding: L9ThxnotKPzthJ7hu3bnORuT6xI=
```

```
SHA1("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy cog")  
gives hexadecimal: de9f2c7fd25e1b3afad3e85a0bd17d9b100db4b3  
gives Base64 binary to ASCII text encoding: 3p8sf9JeGzr60+haC9F9mxANtLM=
```

Pseudocode

Note 1: All variables are unsigned 32-bit quantities and wrap modulo 2^{32} when calculating, except for

ml, the message length, which is a 64-bit quantity, and

hh, the message digest, which is a 160-bit quantity.

*Note 2: All constants in this pseudo code are in **big endian**.*

Within each word, the most significant byte is stored in the leftmost byte position

Initialize variables:

`h0 = 0x67452301`

`h1 = 0xEFCDAB89`

`h2 = 0x98BADCFE`

`h3 = 0x10325476`

`h4 = 0xC3D2E1F0`

`ml = message length in bits (always a multiple of the number of bits in a character).`

Pre-processing:

`append the bit '1' to the message e.g. by adding 0x80 if message length is a multiple of 8 bits.`

`append $0 \leq k < 512$ bits '0', such that the resulting message length in bits is congruent to $-64 \equiv 448 \pmod{512}$`

`append ml, the original message length, as a 64-bit big-endian integer. Thus, the total length is a multiple of 512 bits.`

Pseudocode

Process the message in successive 512-bit chunks:

break message into 512-bit chunks

for each chunk

break chunk into sixteen 32-bit big-endian words $w[i]$, $0 \leq i \leq 15$

Extend the sixteen 32-bit words into eighty 32-bit words:

for i **from** 16 to 79

$w[i] = (w[i-3] \text{ xor } w[i-8] \text{ xor } w[i-14] \text{ xor } w[i-16])$ **leftrotate** 1

Initialize hash value for this chunk:

$a = h0$

$b = h1$

$c = h2$

$d = h3$

$e = h4$

(21655)

Main loop:^{[3][55]}

```
for i from 0 to 79
  if 0 ≤ i ≤ 19 then
    f = (b and c) or ((not b) and d)
    k = 0x5A827999
  else if 20 ≤ i ≤ 39
    f = b xor c xor d
    k = 0x6ED9EBA1
  else if 40 ≤ i ≤ 59
    f = (b and c) or (b and d) or (c and d)
    k = 0x8F1BBCDC
  else if 60 ≤ i ≤ 79
    f = b xor c xor d
    k = 0xCA62C1D6

  temp = (a leftrotate 5) + f + e + k + w[i]
  e = d
  d = c
  c = b leftrotate 30
  b = a
  a = temp
```

Add this chunk's hash to result so far:













```
h0 = h0 + a
h1 = h1 + b
h2 = h2 + c
h3 = h3 + d
h4 = h4 + e
```

Produce the final hash value (big-endian) as a 160-bit number:

```
hh = (h0 leftshift 128) or (h1 leftshift 96) or (h2 leftshift 64) or (h3 leftshift 32) or h4
```


Attacks

- Several attacks were published in 2005, but the computing power was too much to consider the algorithm broken
- 2017 - Google announces the first public collision attack rendering the algorithm broken
<https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html>

Expected behavior: different hashes	Collision attack: same hashes
 Doc 1  Sha-1  42C1..21	 Good doc  Sha-1  3713..42
 Doc 2  Sha-1  3E2A..AE	 Bad doc  Sha-1  3713..42

- Nine quintillion SHA1 computations
- 6,500 years of CPU computation to complete the first phase
- 110 years of GPU computation to complete the second phase
- Still 100,000 times faster than a brute force attack

SHA-256

- Designed by NSA
- 256-bit hash vs 128-bit
- <https://passwordsgenerator.net/sha256-hash-generator/>

References

- <https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~adamchik/15-121/lectures/Hashing/ hashing.html>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collision_attack
- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preimage_attack